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Abstract      
This paper examines 19 major events which include (7) financial crises, (7) terror attacks, and (5) natural 
disasters over the past three decades and the impact on the financial markets of the BRICS and G7 bloc 
of nations. The BRICS, emerging nations, comprise of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, 
whilst the G7 developed nations comprise of the US, UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.  
 
The analysis on how 19 catastrophic events affect the BRICS and G7 economies was conducted using 
an Event Study Methodology implementing the Market Adjusted Model. The methodology popularized 
by Fama, examines the Abnormal Returns (ARs), Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CARs), and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) to determine if there 
are statistical significances using the t-statistical significance tests over an event window of (-5, +5). 
Returns of the market indices are obtained from Yahoo Finance for Brazil’s returns and Thomas Reuters 
DataStream for the remaining 11 for the period between 1989 to 2018. The indices are benchmarked 
against the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) Index, which captures large and mid-caps across 
23 developed and 26 emerging markets, covering approximately 85% of equities markets globally.   
 
We find that emerging economies (BRICS) react stronger to financial crises and terrorist attacks and 
for a prolonged period in comparison to those of the developed nations (G7). Furthermore, it was found 
that there was no statistical significance in neither the BRICS nor G7 nations during natural disaster 
events, apart from The Great Tōhoku (Fukushima) Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan. Moreover, this 
study shows a contamination effect between nations that share a geographical, and more importantly, 
trade partnership, but this spill-over effect has reduced over time as market participants have become 
more acquainted and resilient to these events occurring, especially with terror attacks. 
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1.1 Background and Significance 
 
Over the past Century financial literature has examined the financial markets, the 
decisions of the participants, and market operations within various exchanges whilst 
being subjected to multiple factors in which a multitude of events and/or anomalies 
have impacted the market. During the past five decades there has been a rich body of 
literature surrounding negative events that have plagued the globe that include 
financial crashes, terrorist attacks, and natural disasters.  
 
More recently, at the beginning of the new millennium saw significant events that 
would forever change the world we live in. With the strides in technology leading to 
the internet boom in the late nineties, ultimately crashing down to reality in 2000 which 
would be known as the Dotcom crash of 2000, or a year later, the world hopelessly 
watched as two American airliners ploughed into the World Trade Centres, forever 
changing the airline industry, the way we travel, and forcing a brutal realisation that 
terror could be inflicted on the West, in a large and calculated scale rather than on the 
battlefields of the East. Furthermore, towards the end of the decade saw the largest 
financial crisis since the Great Depression occur in 2008 with the Global Financial 
Crisis bringing the US and the rest of world to the brink of economic and fiscal 
collapse. All these events have painted a dark and permanent stain on the globe in 
which we have ultimately had to adjust our lives as a result.  Regardless of where or 
how these events began, what is certain is that they have all resulted in resounding and 
lasting implications on the global markets and economies surrounding them. As 
globalisation is almost at its peak, according to some, events that occur in one nation 
no longer stay within that immediate region but have impeding and unintentional 
consequences for those across borders, and across continents.  
 
Within this theme, the global powerhouse of the industrial world and economic 
prosperity of the majority western world has seen innovation and growth throughout 
the Twentieth Century slow down as a new and emerging group of nations from the 
East continues to expand with Asia at the forefront of a new era of innovation and 
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technological and economic superiority, and African nations tackling corruption in a 
land full of natural resources.  By no means does this mean the developed nations will 
be left behind, with the US as dominant as ever on the world stage and having the 
largest economy in the world. Although, with China’s dominance in the Asian 
continent cemented and its increasing presence in the African continent, most analysts 
and policy makers view China as the new “threat” to America’s superiority rather than 
past rivalry with Russia.  
 
As the United States of America and most of Western Europe still recover from the 
last two major financial crises to occur since the Great Depression, it brings into 
question the fragility of the financial markets as new players have started to emerge, 
threatening to shuffle the once powerful and feared nations of the West. As the 
production machine begins to slow down in the world’s richest nations, of which they 
had experienced unparalleled growth during the industrial revolution, now face the 
real dilemmas of stagnant growth and pressures to innovate as domestic labour is sent 
offshore to cheaper and financially attractive markets in the emerging world.  And in 
this emerging world are five key nations in which some economists and commentators 
believe will change the financial and economic landscape over the next few decades, 
and they are, the BRICS economies. 
 
In 2003 the emergence of four nations spanning all four corners of the globe began to 
attract the attention of financial and economic professionals who characterized these 
nations as having rapidly growing economies and an increasing international influence 
in their respective regions. The nations of Brazil, Russia, India, and China had all been 
experiencing tremendous growth in their respective regions. Later that year, this group 
of nations would become known as the BRIC alliance, coined by the investment firm 
Goldman Sachs’ chief analyst Jim O’Neill in 2001, in his publication “Building Better 
Global Economic BRICs”. (O'Neill 2010)  
However, this alliance of nations was just a namesake with no real significance until 
2009, when these four countries began to cooperate with each other.  
 
In the Russian city of Yekaterinburg, the four leaders of the BRIC countries gathered 
for the first summit in which economic and social objectives were discussed. A year 
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later, in December 2010, South Africa joined the economic alliance and thereafter 
became known as the BRICS bloc of nations, attending the third summit for the first 
time together in the city of Sanya, China in April of 2011.  
 
Furthermore, economic analysts expect Brazil, China, India, and Russian to join the 
US in becoming the five largest economies by 2050. With the collective five nations 
contributing to 40% of the world’s population, and between them have a combined 
global GDP of more than 20% which gives the BRICS an increasingly important role 
in the international community and therefore making this study’s focus more relevant.  
 
However, there is some scepticism about the growth and significance of the BRICS 
grouping of nations. These five economies have all experienced some levels of shock 
to their respective stock markets that have delayed or hindered growth. Be it natural 
catastrophes, political upheavals, economic sanctions, financial crises, war, or terrorist 
attacks, all these emerging economies have experienced multiple facets of instability.   
 
The Russian Federation has in recent years faced economic and political sanctions that 
have resulted in a volatile economy, with their oil and natural gas industry falling 
drastically recently as prices fall globally due a spat with their Middle Eastern rivals. 
Coupled with the US sanctions for their role in Crimea’s annexation and other political 
scandals, Russia´s growth has all but come to a dramatic U-turn.  
 
Moreover, Brazil, another member of the BRICS has had multiple political scandals 
which have almost always involved some form of economic manipulation and seen the 
country decline drastically as social and political rest continues to ensue.   
 
Another issue to point out and is a key theme within the BRICS nations, is that these 
nations have experienced generational changes in which society has had to drastically 
change and adapt to new risks and uncertainties. From the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
to governmental unrest in South Africa, censorship in China, all of  these nations have 
experienced and overcame events in which most of the developed world has not seen 




Alternatively, there are a group of developed nations that hold annual meetings to 
promote consensus on issues ranging from economic growth and crisis management, 
energy, global security, and terrorism.  This group are known collectively as the Group 
of Seven or G7, with Japan, the US, UK, Germany, Italy, and France making up the 
economic bloc of nations. Formed initially in 1975 with the exclusion of Canada, who 
later joined in 1976, the group of nations was established to allow a forum between 
the industrial powers at the time to discuss economic and political concerns.   
 
Later in 1998, at the end of the cold war, Russia joined the Group of Seven, thus 
becoming the Group of Eight or G8. However, after multiple controversies and 
concerns about Russia’s human rights issues and violations of international laws, 
Russia was removed from the G8 after annexing the Ukrainian city of Crimea in 2014.  
 
These factors and the impact recent global catastrophes have had on the BRICS 
economies and their market participants makes this study more relevant than ever with 
studies such as this adding commentary which can aid a range of financial participants 
such as portfolio managers, sophisticated investors, and policy makers.  The need to 
be aware of the adverse effects that major negative events have upon a variety of 
markets may bridge the gap between the emerging and developed markets as more 
participants enter these emerging markets and help to promote sound global financial 
stability.   
 
1.2 Previous Literature 
 
1.2.1 Significance of News on the Market 
 
In terms of news, events that are announced to the market can either comprise of good 
or bad news that will impact the market and participants within them accordingly. The 
very nature of the market and the efficiency of information,  regardless of whether it 
is of a positive or negative nature, reinforces the importance of continued research into 
certain phenomena that might affect not only a nation’s financial market performance, 
resilience, and participation in times of crisis or triumph, but the possible contagion 
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effect to other markets that may be inadvertently be affected due to the increase of 
globalization and a more interconnected global financial system.  
 
There have been a variety of studies for example that examine the effects that new 
information has had upon stock markets, with the consensus that negative events have 
significant negative impacts on the market, whilst the markets react insignificantly to 
good news.  Studies such as Frey and Kucher (2000:2001), Frey and Waldenstorm 
(2004), Choudhry (2010), and Hudson and Urquhart (2015) observe the effects bad 
news events have on the markets of the US, Europe, and the UK, given partially to 
their involvement in the world’s major conflicts and having sophisticated capital 
markets. Given these findings on the worlds most developed markets, it is therefore a 
valid question to determine if these shocks on the markets flow through to other 
markets reliant on these developed economies and this has led to a wide body of 
literature examining the contagion phenomena.  
 
1.2.2 The Contagion Phenomena 
 
Now that we understand the role and significance news has upon the market and that 
bad news has a detrimental effect on stock markets returns, we should try to gauge the 
significance of this news on the overall efficiency of the world market, which 
ultimately means examining how other markets react to global that may not be within 
their geographical region.  
 
Negative shocks on one country that flow to another are referred to as a contagion or 
spill over which its effects are important in identifying the financial implications both 
for implementing policies as well as for investors, who need to understand the nature 
of changes in stock markets to evaluate the potential benefits of international portfolio 
diversification and the analytical assessment of risks. (Moser 2003) 
 
The importance of this phenomena is important to consider in this study given that we 
examine an aggregate group of nations across similar economic traits and examine 
them within another economic group.  In this case, the BRICS AND G7 nations 
representing the emerging and developed nations, respectively.  
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Moreover, whether good or bad news has a significant effect on market in which such 
a phenonium may exist is also an important consideration to examine. Studies by Bae 
and Karolyi (1994), Beirne, Caporale, Schulze-Ghattas and Spagnolo (2009), and 
Pereria (2018) all examine the impact of good and bad news announcement on various 
developed and emerging markets and examine whether there any signs of a contagion. 
They find that bad news affects both the domestic and foreign nations negatively, along 
with more significance, thus demonstrating that bad news does indeed cause a 
contagion effect. Furthermore, they find that good news has either a good or negative 
reaction on the market, but to a lesser extent.    
 
Given that we now know the significance bad news has upon the markets, there have 
been studies examining the effects of various catastrophise upon various markets. One 
area of focus has been on financial crises and how they have affected the markets 
within their trading blocs as well as outsiders. Examples of financial crises examined 
within the literature include, but not limited to the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998. (Forbes 2002, Forbes & 
Rigobon 2002) 
 
Moreover, there exists a greater body of research that examines the importance of 
global market integration between the emerging and developed nations and whether 
there are significant reactions to a range of catastrophic events that may result in major 
implications for portfolio diversification and policy makers. They find that an increase 
in correlation during a crisis relative to a stable period examined attributes to a 
contagion effect occurring in most cases examined. (King & Wadhwani 1991, Hamao, 
Masulis & Ng 1990, Baig & Goldfajn 1999, Claessens, Parka & Dornbusch 2000, 
Samarakoon 2011, Grima and Caruan 2017)  
 
In addition, it has been found that BRIC economies suffer from US led crises, 
regardless of how volatile each economic bloc was beforehand. Or in other words as 
integration of the markets have increased over time between the developed and 
emerging nations, the contagion effect has been present across the different economic 
nations. (Aggarwal, Inclan, & Leal 1999, Chittedi 2009, Aloiu, Nguyen & Ben Aissa 
2011, Buttner & Hayo 2011) 
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Furthermore, there have been other studies expanding on the grouping of nations that 
have looked to examine the specific relationship between the BRIC nations and most 
advanced of the developed markets, these being the US and the UK. As with the other 
studies mentioned, they find that the BRIC nations are heavily affected by a contagion 
effect from events occurring in developed nations. Interestingly though, they find this 
is less so with events occurring in emerging nations affecting developed nations. 
(Aloiu et al. 2011, Hwang, Min, Kim, & Kim 2013, Bekiros, 2014)  
 
1.2.3 Are the Markets Efficient?  
 
Whether or not there is a contagion present during a catastrophic event, the timing of 
the information being released upon the market in a timely way in which all 
information is correctly priced into the market is a major concern for all market 
participants and has over the years provided quite the debate about its existence. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) often credited by Samuelson’s (1965) suggests 
that investors are rational and consider all available information in the financial 
decision-making process.  
 
A market is deemed to be efficient when the financial market in which the arrival of 
new information is reflected onto the financial asset prices, is immediately recognised 
through the returns, ensuing that investors are not able to make excess gains from any 
potential information leak on the market. (Yolsal 2011) 
 
Fama (1970), a pioneer of the EMH and a strong defender of the theory suggests three 
forms of efficiency that explain how returns are priced and perceived on the market. 
These being, the weak form, in which a market is deemed efficient if the current price 
reflects all information contained in the past prices, and therefore it becomes 
impossible to develop technical analysis to identify mispriced stocks. Fama (1970) 
 
The semi- strong form, which examines the speed of price adjustments on stocks and 
returns react to information that is readily available and expected by the public, such 
as annual financial reports. This form implies that as soon as publicly made 
information is available, it is rapidly integrated into the prices, which impedes 
17 
 
investors from making significant gains by using this information to make forecasts of 
returns.  If this form remains true, it means profit from both technical analyses and 
fundamental analysis is unobtainable. (Cuthbertson 1996) 
 
And the strong form which examines investors or groups who have access to inside 
information and determine whether they can earn excess returns off the markets based 
on this insider knowledge. Fama finds that the market prices do reflect all insider and 
public information; therefore, even investors with secret knowledge of an event cannot 
profiteer from leaked information.  
 
However, as with most theories, there has been strong debate about the validity of such 
an efficiency, in which certain stock price anomalies have brought into question the 
markets efficiency.  
 
A stock price anomaly can be defined as behaviours or patterns in an asset returns 
which are consistent, thus resulting in an investor making a significant gain/profit from 
these patterns in the market as they take advantage of the predictability of those 
returns. This has contributed to much debate and continues to being challenged to this 
day as the literature goes back and forth in addressing these anomalies. (Schwart 2003, 
Yolsal 2011) 
 
Studies attributing such anomalies include factors regarding transaction volumes, 
volatility, calendar, and seasonal anomalies, all of which have been observed in 
financial market and as such, raised the importance of how these anomalies have 
affected the decision-making process and whether they have altered the marketplaces 
and their “efficiency”. (Treynor 1965, Jensen 1968) 
 
1.2.4 Event Studies  
 
We know have an idea of how bad news can impact a market, the potential contagion 
effect, and the presence of an efficient market. However, to continue to example these 
events and anomalies, either in the future or the past events, we must have a framework 
to test them.  
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The event study is one such research methodology and provides the researcher a 
simplistic and flexible method to test these questions and more.  
 
The event study has been attributed to the early work of Dolley (1933) in which they 
examine the stock price reaction to stock splits in a selected sample of 95 splits over a 
period between 1921 to 1931. The study finds that the price of the 95 splits increased 
in 57 of the samples selected and the remaining 26 sample splits, the price declined. 
 
Moreover, the way in which we conduct an event study today and the literature 
surrounding it has been attributed to two pioneering studies by Ball and Brown (1968), 
and Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll (1969).  They both examine how certain stock 
splits and events impact the market and as time went by, this method became an 
unintentional research methodology that has grown into popularity among fellow 
researchers.  As a consequence of this popularity, the body of literature surrounding 
event studies has extended significantly with sub-sections of literature looking at the 
violations of the statistical assumptions implemented in an event study along with 
making according adjustments in the design of an event study to cater for specific 
hypotheses. (Corrado 2011)   
 
Furthermore, research by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) recognise the importance 
of modifications to such studies and discuss the implementation issues with data 
sampled at monthly intervals, whilst their later paper discusses data sampled at daily 
intervals to overcome those issues. (MacKinlay 1997) 
 
This latter study of MacKinlay’s has become the most prevalent use of an event study 
and allows the researcher the opportunity to measure the abnormal returns more 
precisely than had been possible with monthly data.   
 
Moreover, the use of the event study and the improvements to it has further made the 
methodology appropriate in examining a variety of negative events such as financial 




1.2.5 Financial Crises  
During the past few decades there have been a variety of financial disasters that have 
had detrimental effects on the international financial markets such as the Mexican Debt 
Crisis of 1982, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998, the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007, and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis shortly thereafter.  The number of 
events and the frequency at which they occurred have put a spotlight onto the financial 
industry with investors becoming more critical of the events that occur during a crisis 
and the effects it has on their investment returns.   
Studies conducted on the Mexican crisis highlighted the occurrence of a contagion 
effect in Latin America which caused a catastrophic effect on the financial markets in 
the America’s but also Europe. Studies by Schoder and Vankudre (1986), Cornell and 
Shapiro (1986), Brown and Warner (1985), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) examine the 
effect that the crisis has on various markets and found that markets react negatively to 
a bad news event.  Their findings suggest there is a unified reaction to negative 
announcements on the market, with markets reacting negatively to the crisis occurring 
in this emerging part of the world from those nations that are in the developed, but to 
a lessor degree.    
 
1.2.6 Terror Attacks 
 
Terrorism has been a growing problem over the past four decades, with the frequency 
and impact increasing dramatically over the last two decades. Much of the literature 
surrounding terrorism and the effects on the markets focus on three major attacks 
which occurred in the last two decades, The attacks on New York City on September 
11th, 2001, the Madrid bombings of 2004, and the London bombings in 2005.  Studies 
by Carter and Simkins (2004), Chen and Siems (2004), Nikkinen and Vahamaa (2010), 
Kollias, Papadamou and Stagiannis (2011) examine the effects that these attacks had 
on various stock markets and found they had significant negative impacts on markets. 
Whilst the US market has become more resilient than earlier attacks in history with 




Further studies by Brounen and Derwell (2010) examine the effects of terrorist attacks 
on various stock markets in major economies of the world. They find that terrorist 
attacks have only mild negative price effects, rebounding after a week of the event 
occurring. Nations that suffer the terror attacks domestically, experience the most 
reaction on their stock markets, with the contagion effect having less impact on nations 
outside the attack. 
 
Arin, Cifferi and Spagnolo (2008) also find significant negative effects on the market, 
especially in the Asian and Middle Eastern regions. They show these areas had more 
adverse effects than the two European countries examined, the United Kingdom and 
Spain.  Their finding signifies that emerging markets experience more significant 
shocks to their markets for longer, whilst developed nations are more resilient in times 
of terrorist attacks, thus reinforcing the importance of this study.  
 
1.2.7 Natural Disaster  
  
Lastly, there has been an increasing number of studies examining the impacts of 
natural disasters on various markets, although this has mainly looked at specific sectors 
such as insurance, construction, and real estate on the domestic level. The common 
findings are that natural disasters have a negative effect on market returns and markets 
react to the bad information almost immediately. However the significance and impact 
of these events are small compared with financial crises and terror attacks. (Shelor et 
al. 1992, Yamori & Kobayashi 2002, Odell & Weidenmier 2004, Worthington & 
Valadkhani 2004, Yang et al. 2008, Li 2013, Tao 2014) 
 
1.3 Purpose and Motivation 
 
The purpose of this paper after examining the prior literature is to therefore examine 
how major global calamities have affected, if at all, the world’s key emerging 
economies and developed nations by examining the impacts of key negative events 




Over the past few decades, there have been a variety of global financial crises, terror 
attacks, and natural disasters that have impacted nations across the globe and as such 
created a large amount of interest, in terms of policy making and investment behaviour. 
Given the increase of catastrophic events occurring, there has been a growing amount 
of literature examining these events and this paper will hope to contribute to this body 
of literature.  
 
The significance of negative events that have plagued countless generations and 
brought markets to the brink of collapse for centuries has also increased uncertainty in 
a challenging time that can test the foundational structures of institutions that have 
stood unchallenged for so long.  
 
With the political and economic landscape looking more rocky than stable, it will be 
interesting to see how major global markets react to major shocks throughout the globe 
and whether the market reaction and therefore investor behaviour has changed over 
time. With the increase in social media and online media in general, the general 
population are becoming more vocal and aware of their position on the global stage 
and it will be interesting to see how, if at all, the impact negative events have on the 
markets which ultimately is based on investor behaviour and the efficiency or 
inefficiencies of the markets they operate in.   
 
Furthermore, this study aims to add to the surrounding literature on the impact bad 
news has on the markets in terms of a short term reaction and determine if there is any 
contagion effects and/or similarities between the major developed and emerging 
economies shortly after a event occurring.  
 
Past literature has largely focused on a small sample of nations with a close 
geographical or trade partnership/bloc, domestic reaction to an event, or on other 
economic factors such as GDP.  This paper hopes to add to this literature in terms of 
examining the BRICS and G7, two key economic groups of nations that are leaders in 




Additionally, given the extensive literature on financial crises, terror attacks, and 
natural disasters, this paper will contribute to this existing body of literature on whether 
the 12 selected economies and their corresponding markets have become more resilient 
overtime, and hence would provide a view on the efficient market hypothesis of Fama.  
 
It will be interesting to see if the BRICS economies show the same reactions against 
the markets of Western European and Northern America and whether they experience 
the same volatility spill overs as Europe and America have experienced. As the BRICS 
economies continue to grow, especially China and Russia, more research regarding 
their capital markets and reaction will be needed for financial and government policy 
makers to better understand the impact certain events, both good and bad, have on the 
international financial markets in the future.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, there has been no prior research or study examining the 
BRICS and G7 nations as a collective in examining the reaction of the markets in a 
range of financial crises, terror attacks, and natural disaster events. As such, this study 
aims to shed light on whether major global events affect both emerging and developed 
economies, and if there are any similarities between the economic blocs and if the 
markets react quickly to the information.   
 
Lastly, for disclosure and in line with the Oulu Business School thesis guidelines, this 
study was inspired by my previous studies conducted during my undergraduate studies 
in Australia. During my honours year, in which I wrote a bachelor’s thesis, entitled 
“Do Eurozone Sovereign Credit Downgrade Events Effect the Banking Sector: An 
Australian Study” I examined the impact that the Eurozone Debt Crisis had upon the 
Australia Banking Sector. As such, there are some parts, in relation to the event study 
literature and financial crisis literature, that I have used in this study. Although I have 
made drastic changes in terms of significant updates, providing a more detailed 
commentary, and eliminating irrelevant literature  




1.4 Structure of Thesis  
 
The structure of this thesis begins with a discussion of the prior literature on various 
key topics and themes within this papers scope and has been divided into three 
chapters.   
 
Chapter Two will discuss the origins of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the three 
forms of efficiency, and the arguments against such a theory.  Chapter Three 
investigates the contagion phenomenon and how nations that are integrated might be 
subject to such an effect. Whilst Chapter Four discusses how Event Studies have been 
used to examine a variety of catastrophic events and the implications on various 
markets.  
 
Continuing from the literature, Chapter Five provides a detailed account of the Event 
Study Methodology with discussions on the framework, its implementation, and 
considerations in conducting a successful event study with concluding remarks on the 
data used in this study.  
 
Chapter Six covers the analysis and commentary of the empirical results of the study, 
and this chapter is divided into three sub-sections as per event categories of financial 
crises, terror attacks, and natural disasters. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Six ends with a discussion of the key findings in the paper, our 
contribution to the wider literature, limitations of the study, and the future directions 
that could be made to further enhance the research in this field by others with the 
references and appendices included thereafter.  
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2 STOCK MARKET EFFICIENCY 
2.1 Background in Market Efficiency 
 
One of the most renowned theories of our century, the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) is often credited by Samuelson’s (1965) study entitled “Proof that Properly 
Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly”. However, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1997) attribute the theoretical contribution of the Efficient Market Hypothesis to 
earlier works by Bachelier (1900) and the empirical contribution to Cowles (1933) 
with Samuelson (1965) and Fama’s (1965) studies providing the fundamentals for how 
the theories are used today. 
 
The theory suggests that investors are rational and consider all available information 
in the financial decision-making process. Furthermore, a market is deemed to be 
efficient when the financial market where the arrival of new information is reflected 
onto the financial asset prices is immediately seen through the returns, ensuing that 
investors are not able to make excess gains from any potential information leak on the 
market. (Yolsal 2011)  
As such, both technical analysis and fundamental analysis, which examine past stock 
prices in attempt to predict future value and analysing corporate information such as 
earning and asset values to aid investor select undervalued stocks, respectively, would 
not be possible in obtaining returns greater than using a randomly selected portfolio of 
stocks. (Malkiel 2003) 
 
EMH has been tested using forms of event studies using residual analysis techniques 
first introduced by Fama, Fischer, Jensen, & Roll (1969), in which studies have 
demonstrated on average that the market does indeed react quickly to the arrival of 
new information confirming the validity of the market efficiency hypothesis. Although 
there is a range of contrarian literature which opposes these findings in the form of 
anomalies, which I will discuss later in the section.  
   
Regarding the overall aspect of “new information” being released efficiently on 
market, we must first understand what new information is.  New information occurs 
when an event or announcement that may influence stock prices at the present point in 
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time becomes random in the future. In contrast, old information according to Fama 
(1965), is characterized into three types of old information, which correspond in three 
different categories within the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  These being weak-form 
efficiencies, semi-strong efficiencies, and strong-form efficiencies. (Fama 1970)  
 
Moreover, three decades since Fama’s pioneering studies within market efficiency and 
event studies, these categories where again revisited in 1991 as Fama examined the 
contributions of others to this area of study such as Lo and Campbell (1988), and 
French and Roll, (1986), and ultimately updated these categories of efficiency into 
Return Predictability, Event Studies, and Tests for Private Information.  (Fama 1991)  
  
2.2 Weak Form/Return Predictability 
 
In his earlier work, Fama (1970) describes a weak form efficiency, where the 
information subclass the researcher is interested in is either historical returns or prices. 
If the market efficiency is considered weak, investors will be unable to make excess 
gains on past prices or returns. The consensus of studies surrounding this form of 
efficiency find that weak form efficiencies support the efficient market hypothesis, 
which opens the door for studies looking at semi-strong tests to determine if these 
results (match).  Furthermore, if these results are indeed a weak form of the EMH, a 
market is deemed efficient if the current price reflects all information contained in the 
past prices, and therefore it becomes impossible to develop technical analysis to 
identify mispriced stocks.  
 
In his 1991 paper, Fama decided to reclassify the form given the limited scope at the 
time of only including the forecasting power of past returns.  Reclassifying into return 
predictability covers a broader area of tests for return predictability, which includes 
forecast returns and their variables such as dividend yields and interest rates. 
Moreover, given the literature of anomalies such as size effect, seasonal (January) 
returns, and security price volatility, this first stage covers the cross‐sectional 




2.3 Semi-Strong Form/Event Studies 
 
The second classification of market efficiency is the semi-strong tests that examines 
the speed of price adjustments on stocks and returns react to information that is readily 
available and expected by the public, such as annual financial reports. This form 
implies that as soon as publicly made information is available, it is rapidly integrated 
into the prices, which impedes investors from making significant gains by using this 
information to make forecasts of returns.  If this form remains true, it means profit 
from both technical analyses and fundamental analysis is unobtainable. For example, 
asset prices that already reflect all publicly available information cannot make 
abnormal returns form either analysis. (Cuthbertson 1996). 
 
Fama’s 1991 changes for this form was only to the title, rather than the coverage and 
as such is now known as, event studies, which we deem appropriate given the 
popularization of Fama’s unintentional methodology at the time of forming the semi-
strong form, which is commonly used to test the market efficiency in the adjustment 
of prices to public announcements today.  
 
2.4 Strong Form/Insider Trading 
 
The third form of market efficiency, preciously known as the strong form, examines 
investors or groups who have access to inside information, and whether they can earn 
excess returns off the markets based on this insider knowledge. Fama finds that the 
market prices do reflect all insider and public information; therefore, even investors 
with secret knowledge of an event cannot profiteer from leaked information.  
In other words, the strong form reflects the semi form, with prices reflecting all 
information, both public and private, which therefore prohibits profits being made 
from either technical analysis, fundamental analysis, nor insider trading.  
 
Given that this form tests private information, Fama’s 1991 paper decided to rename 
the form in a more descriptive aspect, and now the strong form is known today as “tests 




2.5 Opposition to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, the Case of Anomalies 
 
As previously mentioned, in contrast to Fama and other studies that signify the market 
is indeed efficient and thus stock prices reflect new information, there has been an 
increasing amount contrasting literature that scrutinizes this theory and suggests to 
some extent, the ability to predict returns based on behaviour of past stock prices, with 
relevance to notable market anomalies and investor behaviour.  
 
A stock price anomaly can be defined as behaviours or patterns in an asset returns 
which are consistent, thus resulting in an investor making a significant gain/profit from 
these patterns in the market and taking advantage of the predictability of those returns. 
This nonetheless has led to much debate and is still being challenged to this day as the 
literature goes back and forth in addressing these anomalies (Yolsal 2011, Schwart 
2003) 
 
The so-called rise of such a debate was particularly prevalent within the behavioural 
finance field in the mid-1980s, around twenty years after Fama’s paper entitled 
“Efficient Market Hypothesis”. Contrasting with Markowitz’s Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, it is said that in fact investors do not act rationally and as a result financial 
models do not fit the market. There have been hundreds of studies attributing factors 
such as transaction volumes, volatility, calendar, and seasonal anomalies which can be 
observed in financial market and which has bought the importance of how human 
behaviour has been affected by these anomalies and how the decisions making process 
may be altered in the marketplaces depending on an investor’s individual nature. 
Additional, in relation to the third form, we know of instances of insider trading 
occurring, which therefore brings into question the strong form market efficiency. 
(Treynor 1965, Jensen 1968)  
 
More recently, a paper by Malkiel (2003), who wrote “A Radom Walk Down Wall 
Street” published in 1973, investigates these anomalies in the literature and provides a 
sound analysis on the age-old question of whether the market is indeed efficient or 
inefficient. One of those anomalies is the equity risk premium puzzle which continues 
to baffle researchers and economists.  This puzzle questions the efficiency of the 
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market as it suggests that markets are less than fully rational in the existence of a very 
large historical equity risk premium that seems inconsistent with the actual riskiness 
of common stocks that can be measured statistically. For example, studies have been 
unable to fully comprehend why it has been found that equities over time have 
produced significantly highly returns than those of bonds.  
 
But as with most anomalies, there have been attempts to explain this, with Fama and 
French (2002), attributing this phenomenon (equity risk puzzle) to large, unexpected 
capital gains, rather than a random anomaly. (Malkiel 2003)  
 
As with most literature that debates market efficiency and the presence of market 
anomalies, there are no black and white solutions.  Malkiel goes on to emphasise that 
there will be those market participants who will be less rational and therefore give the 
ability of others to make predictions on those irregularities, thus deeming the market 
inefficient. However, as time goes on, these irrationalities will be priced into the 
market and no longer persist, which will end the investors ability of obtaining 
extraordinary returns from this, or in other words making the market efficient.  In 
conclusion to his analysis, he quite adeptly concluded with: 
 
“If any $100 bills are lying around the stock exchanges of the world, they will 





3 MARKET CONTAGION, CROSS-MARKET LINKAGES, AND 
INTEGRATION  
3.1 Contagion Phenomenon in the Presence of Market Integration  
The contagion phenomenon and its effects are important in identifying the financial 
implications both for implementing policies and for investors, who need to understand 
the nature of changes in stock markets to evaluate the potential benefits of international 
portfolio diversification and the analytical assessment of risks. (Moser 2003) 
In both a theoretical and empirical sense there is no consensus about whether events 
that cause cross-county transmission should be considered a contagion. There has been 
various definitions of a contagion with Forbes and Rigobon (2002) describing a 
contagion as a significant increase of co-movements of a particular market after an 
initial shock. Furthermore, Bonga Bonga (2018) delves into two variations of 
contagion, with the latter being relevant for this study, being an investor-behavior 
contagion. This type of contagion Bonga explains, is the result of a change in investor 
behaviour which alters the investment flow which cannot be explained by economic 
fundamentals. (Bonga Bonga 2018)  
For example, say that in one emerging country there happens to be a financial crisis 
which results in investors withdrawing funds from many or all other emerging markets 
without examining the fundamental differences in economic status. If this irrational 
behaviour occurs, then nations that have sound economic fundamentals will be 
seriously affected regardless, which is the definition of a contagion. 
The importance of this phenomena is important to consider in this study given that we 
examine an aggregate group of nations across similar economic traits, with the BRICS 
representing the emerging nations, and the G7, the developed.  
Given the implications of such a phenomenon occurring it is no surprise that there is a 
large body of literature examining the contagion of an event occurring, with prevalence 
in financial crises research. With several studies having analysed these contagion 
30 
 
effects in various financial markets, for example in Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998. (Forbes 2002, Forbes & 
Rigobon 2002) 
Earlier studies by King and Wadhwani (1990), and Lee and Kim (1993) show there to 
be an increase in correlation during a crisis relative to a stable period examined which 
they attribute to a contagion effect occurring.  
King and Wadhwani (1991) examined the US crash of 1987 and find a contagion 
between New York, London, and Tokyo immediate after the market crashing. Whilst 
Hamao, Masulis and Ng (1990), examine the same cities, look at both good and bad 
news on the market and corresponding volatility and find that the spill over effects is 
more prevalent during times of a financial crisis.  These finding will be interesting to 
consider during the Dotcom in 2000 and Chinese Black Monday of 2015.   
Baig and Goldfajn (1999) examine the Asian Financial crisis and use a cross-market 
correlation for exchange rates, stock returns, interest rates, and sovereign bond 
spreads. They find that there is evidence of contagion and high correlation among, 
stock returns which that spreads directly and therefore the presence of risk perception 
of financial markets, indicates that pure contagion may be the result of the behaviour 
of investors or other financial agents. Whilst Claessens, Parka and Dornbusch (2000) 
examine the same financial crisis and find that market movements are either reinforced 
or weakened in periods of high turbulence. Interestingly, they also find that negative 
shocks have a more profound impact on other markets, which also respond negatively, 
which contrasts with good news which can lead to either a positive or negative market 
responses. They attribute this finding to the behaviour of investors on the markets that 
tend to exit all markets during a crisis period. 
A later study by Samarakoon (2011) examines the impact on emerging markets and 
the US to shocks and find that interdependence is seen in relation to US shocks in 
contrast with emerging market shocks that present a contagion effect. Furthermore, 
Grima and Caruan (2017) find that BRIC economies suffer from US led crises, 
regardless of how volatile each economic bloc was beforehand.  
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3.2 Cross Market Linkages & Integration in Emerging and Developed Nations  
Regarding integration of the financial markets, which is when markets are incorporated 
with one another and considered an important aspect to market participants, Buttner 
and Hayo (2011) find although this benefits the access to foreign capital, the downside 
is the vulnerability during a financial crisis that occurs within one of those nations.  
An earlier study by Aggarwal, Inclan, and Leal (1999) examine events that caused 
significant impact on emerging nations markets volatility and find volatility comoves 
between them during such events as a financial crisis. Whilst Aloiu, Nguyen and Ben 
Aissa (2011) examine cross market linkages between the US and BRIC markets during 
financial crises.  They show that the nations within the BRIC have greater dependency 
on the US in nations that rely heavily on commodities such as Russian and Brazil, 
whereas China and India do not. 
Chittedi (2009) examinate this relationship between the BRIC nations and US, UK, 
and Japanese markets and found that the US, along with Japan, influence Indian stock 
market due to international trade, which contradicts Aloiu et al. (2011) findings. 
Moreover, and important for context of this study, they also found that the BRICs and 
developed economies of the US, UK, and Japan were more integrated than the past.  
Furthermore, Hwang, Min, Kim, and Kim (2013) looked at the daily returns of 10 
emerging nations in comparison to the US for a four-year period between 2006 and 
2010. They found spill-over across the 10 emerging nations examined in which they 
classified the spill-overs into contagion, herd behaviour, and post crisis adjustment. 
The integration of the markets increasing over time between the developed and 
emerging nations of the BRICs was also found to be true in Bekiros (2014) paper that 
included the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis with a 
contagion present across the different economic nations.  
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3.3 Contagion Effects on Good or Bad News  
Given that we recognize a contagion effect exists along with the presence of 
integration that can emphasise such a contagion, the effect that good or bad news has 
upon such a phenonium is important to examine.  
Bae and Karolyi (1994) study the Japanese and US markets between 1988 and 1992 
and find that news within a examined market does influence short-term volatility of 
stock prices to the other market.  Moreover, they also find that bad news from both the 
domestic and foreign nations has a more significant impact on the volatility of returns 
than good news does.  
Over a decade later, Beirne, Caporale, Schulze-Ghattas and Spagnolo (2009) paper 
examined the spill over between developed economies and emerging economies. They 
find that volatility in emerging stock markets is higher in periods where mature 
markets are in crisis. Whilst Pereria (2018) analyses and extends the study of contagion 
for the BRICS emerging stock markets in the context of the last two international 
financial crises, the Global Financial Crisis as Lehman Brothers announces 
bankruptcy, and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. They use daily data of the 
national stock indices of the BRICS, EU, and US and find that changes in the EU and 
US indices does flow onto the returns of the BRICS markets in the short- run.  
These findings reinforce the importance of our study and the research question being 
examined as we examine global market integration between the emerging and the 
developed nations of the G7 and the BRICS and whether there are significant reactions 
to a range of catastrophic events that may result in major implications for portfolio 




4 EVENT STUDY: TESTS OF THE SECOND LEVEL OF STOCK 
EFFICIENCY  
 
The literature surrounding event studies is rich and informative. According to 
MacKinley (1997), event studies can be attributed to the early work of Dolley (1933).  
In this pioneering study, Dolly examined the stock price reaction to stock splits in a 
selected sample of 95 splits over a period between 1921 to 1931. The study found that 
the price of the 95 splits increased in 57 of the samples selected and the remaining 26 
sample splits, the price declined.  Interestingly, despite those results and the methods 
that were used to conduct the study, it would not be until three decades later that this 
type of study was conducted in a way which would lead to what we refer today as an 
event study methodology.  
 
This research methodology that is commonly used today, examines a variety of events 
and their effect on the capital market. Within the body of literature there are two 
pioneer studies that are often attributed to the use of the event study today and these 
studies are by Ball and Brown (1968), and Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969), with 
Fama baffled at his research theses unintentional use as a widely accepted 
methodology.  Both papers have been creditied for their use of the market model, along 
with the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe in 1964. 
(Corrado 2011)    
 
Ball and Brown’s 1968 study criticized current analytical methods at the time, stating 
that the: 
 
“shortcoming of this method is that it ignores a significant source of knowledge 
of the world, namely, the extent to which the predictions of the model conform 
to observed behaviour.” (Ball & Brown 1968, pg. 159)   
 
As the decades since those pioneering studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et 
al. (1969) have gone by, the body of literature surrounding event studies have extended 
significantly with sub-sections of literature looking at the violations of the statistical 
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assumptions implemented in an event study along with making according adjustments 
in the design of an event study to cater for specific hypotheses. (Corrado 2011)   
 
Furthermore, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) recognise the importance of 
modifications in which their 1980 paper discusses the implementation issues with data 
sampled at monthly intervals, whilst their later paper discusses data sampled at daily 
intervals. (MacKinlay 1997) The latter study, which examined daily intervals, has 
become the most prevalent use in an event study as it allows the researcher the 
opportunity to measure the abnormal returns more precisely than previously possible 
with monthly data.   
 
Using daily data has meant that the effect news announcements have upon the stock 
market can be examined and had led to a variety of topics being researched such as 
firm related, policy related, nation related, and so on. Moreover, Fama (1991) has 
continued to contribute enormously to the area of event studies and highlighted the 
importance of understanding of how expected returns operate in the economy as well 
as how expected returns vary over time.  The use of an event study has allowed other 
researchers to add to the field with this methodology being one of the most effective 
methods, yet simplistic in measuring the effects of news reports upon the financial 
market.  
 
And finally, with the increase of high frequency and other algorithmic trading, this has 
resulted in the increased speed of stock prices reflected new information. Additionally, 
as we are no seeing news events being released through social media tweets at the click 
of a button, which has also contributed to the increase of intraday event studies which 
can examine the effect of an announcement to the minute, if the research deems is 
appropriate. A wide range of researcher find this more appropriate especially in areas 
such as securities litigation, the investigation of insider trading, or reactions to market 
price, volume, and spreads. (Marshall et al. 2017) 




4.1 Significance of Bad News on Global Markets 
 
Given the breadth of event studies and how they have evolved over the decades in 
effectively examining an almost unlimited range of scenarios within finance discourse 
and the wider academic community, the very nature of a news announcement, be it 
positive or negative, also has a significant impact and corresponding consequence in 
the implications found in an event study.  
 
Since the stock markets inception, events which comprise both good and bad news 
impact the market and participants within them. The very nature of the market and the 
efficiency of information, regardless of whether it is of a positive or negative nature, 
reinforces the importance of continued research into certain phenomena that might 
affect not only a nation’s financial market performance, resilience, and participation 
in times of crisis or triumph, but the possible contagion effect to other markets that 
may be inadvertently be affected due to the increase of globalization and a more 
interconnected global financial system.  
 
Mackinlay (1997) and Antweiller and Frank (2006) use an event study methodology 
to determine the relationship that the British media broadcasters, The BBC, news 
reports have on stock price volatility within the UK Finance Index of the FTSE 100. 
The study is extremely effective in establishing a relationship between a news 
announcement and comparing it with a particular market index to determine whether 
an announcement has a positive or negative effect on the financial market, and on a 
specific period. They find that negative news has significance on the market in terms 
of negative reactions whereas good news can either be a positive or negative reaction.  
 
Furthermore, studies that examine the effects war has had upon stock markets have 
been done to some extent with a consensus view that negative events have significant 
negative impact on the market, whilst the markets react insignificantly to good news. 
(Frey and Kucher 2000, Frey and Kucher 2001), Frey and Waldenstorm 2004, 




These studies observe the effects bad news events have on the markets of the US, 
Europe, and the UK, given partially to their involvement in the world’s major conflicts 
and having sophisticated capital markets. This type of event typically has a long 
duration and effects the nations that are directly affected.  
 
There have also been papers that examine the difference of good and bad news 
announcements and the effects upon the market, with a key paper by Aktar, Faff, 
Oliver and Subrahmanyam (2011). They find significance in bad news on the 
Australian All Ordinaries Index, in addition to this type of news having a substantially 
negative impact on the announcement day, in contrast with good news, which was 
found to have no significance on the Australian market. This finding in particular, 
along with the popular body of literature that examines market participants and their 
reactions to negative events, makes this study relevant in examining instances of 
significant bad news events or catastrophises and conducting analysis to compare with 
the surrounding literature to determine if these key negative events in our history has 
also had an effect on multiple market participants within a similar economic status 
such as the emerging economies that are known as the BRICS, or within the developed 
nations of the G7.  As such we aim to look at the most significant events considered to 
be of a highly negative nature and cause of concern for behavioural finance and 
investor sentiment in extreme occurrences, which are natural disasters, financial crises, 
and terrorism attacks. 
 
4.2 Event Study Categories  
4.2.1 Financial Crises 
 
As mentioned previously, the effect news announcements have upon the stock market, 
particularly negative events, has been researched extensively over the decades with 
Fama (1991) contributing enormously to this area and discovering that there was a 
yearning to gain an understanding of how expected returns operate in the economy as 
well as how expected returns vary over time.  Moreover, the literature on financial 
meltdowns is rich and there are exemplary studies discussing market and investor 




During those past decades there have been a variety of financial disasters that have had 
detrimental effects on the international financial markets such as the Mexican Debt 
Crisis of 1982, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/1998, the Global Financial Crisis of 
2007, and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis shortly thereafter.  The number of 
events and the frequency at which they occurred have put a spotlight onto the financial 
industry with investors becoming more critical of the events that occur during a crisis 
and the effects it has on their investment returns.   
 
Studies conducted on the Mexican crisis highlighted the occurrence of a contagion 
effect in Latin America which caused a catastrophic effect on the financial markets in 
the America’s but also within Europe. They examine the effect this bad news has on 
the market and found that the market reacts negatively to such news occurring.  Their 
findings suggest there is a unified reaction to negative announcements on the market, 
with markets reacting negatively to the crisis occurring in this emerging part of the 
world. (Schoder and Vankudre 1986, Cornell and Shapiro 1986, Brown and Warner 
1985, Smirlock and Kaufold 1987)  
 
Furthermore, the literature concerning developed nations also attests to this very theory 
during financial crises. During the Asian Crisis of the 1990’s, the Global Financial 
crisis in 2008, and the Eurozone crisis a year later; significant bad news events such 
as bailouts, austerity measures, sovereign downgrading events, and political upheavals 
all had negative reactions on the market as investors began to take notice of the 
growing risks of globalization and the preceding contagion effect that spread quickly 
and mercilessly. (Kaminsky & Schmukler 1999, Radelet & Sachs 2000, Singala & 
Kumar 2012) 
 
Moreover, studies have been conducted on a variation of emerging and developed 
nations such as examining the volatility spill-over effects of a financial crisis and the 
impact on European, American, and BRICS nations. Bekiros (2014) paper examined 
the contagion effects of the Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt 
Crisis and found that the BRICS nations are more internationally integrated after the 




Further studies examine the impacts of the U.S. originating Global Financial Crisis on 
a variety of emerging markets to examine whether US financial disasters have 
influence on the market returns of other nations.  
 
Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) used an event study to examine 15 news 
announcements during the Global Financial Crisis in the US on 14 emerging markets. 
They found that emerging markets where rather resilient to U.S financial developments 
during the beginning of 2007 to mid-2008. However, as Lehman collapsed, causing a 
chain of other significant economic calamities, the emerging markets began to mirror 
these negative market reactions on their markets.  
 
And finally, a more recent paper by Ranjeeni and Sharma (2015) examined the event 
of Lehman Brothers collapse on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and various sectors in 
which they found that the bankruptcy announcement significantly impacted several 
sectors on the Chinese market which led to their markets to drop significantly.  
 
Given these findings, this study aims to compare those results on the leading developed 
nations and leading emerging markets on multiple financial crises over time to 
determine whether there is any significance in how markets react to an event, and the 
potential contagion they have on other markets.  
 
4.2.2 Terror Attacks  
 
Terrorism has been a growing problem over the past four decades, with the frequency 
and impact increasing dramatically over the last two decades. Terrorism, as defined by 
the Global Terrorism Database1 is:  
                                                 
1 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD)™ is the most comprehensive unclassified database of terrorist 
attacks in the world. The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START) makes the GTD available via this site in an effort to improve understanding of terrorist 
violence, so that it can be more readily studied and defeated.  the GTD is an open-source database, 
which provides information on domestic and international terrorist attacks around the world since 1970, 
and now includes more than 200,000 events. For each event, a wide range of information is available, 
including the date and location of the incident, the weapons used, nature of the target, the number of 





“the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to 
achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation.” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2020) 
 
Since 1970, there has been over 200,000 terror related events occurring, which over 












Arguably the most infamous attacks in recent times which started one of the longest 
occupations by US forces, was September 11. An attack in which two commercial 
airliners ploughed into the World Trade Centers live on TV and broadcast across the 
globe in an event unprecedented in terms of a highly coordinated attack on a Western 
target. Since that fateful September morning, and the decade that followed, there have 
been countless terrorist attacks aimed at the international community and transformed, 
literally, how we live today. From the streets of London and Paris, to the hotel and bars 
of Mumbai and Bali, terror has been inflicted on a large and dramatic scale and in term 
spooked markets and investors across the globe at this rise of uncertainty.  
 
These unprecedented events ultimately led to a rise in body of literature surrounding 
terrorism and the implications on the capital market. The increase in literature on terror 
event has been attributed to the amount of exposure such terror attacks have upon 
society today and the scale and locations of such attacks, thanks in part, to the media 
Figure 1 - Number of Terror Attacks since 1970 (GTD, 2020) 
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and the internet, bringing war into our daily lives, which we in the West have not been 
accustom to.  
 
Much of the literature surrounding terrorism and the effects on the markets focus on 
three major attacks which occurred in the last two decades. The attacks on New York 
City on September 11th, 2001, the Madrid bombings of 2004, and the London 
bombings in 2005.  Studies by Carter and Simkins (2004), Chen and Siems (2004), 
Nikkinen and Vahamaa (2010), and Kollias, Papadamou and Stagiannis (2011) 
examine the effects that these attacks had on various stock markets and found they had 
significant negative impacts on markets.  
 
Chen and Siems (2004) examined attacks dating back to 1915 using an event study 
methodology and found significant effects on the US capital markets. They however 
showed that the US markets have become more resilient than earlier attacks in history 
and the markets in the US show recovery sooner than terror attacks on other 
international markets.  
 
Arin, Cifferi and Spagnolo (2008) also find significant negative effects on the market, 
especially in the Asian and Middle Eastern regions. They showed these areas had more 
adverse effects than the two European countries examined, the United Kingdom and 
Spain. This finding signifies that emerging markets experience more significant shocks 
to their markets and for longer, whilst developed nations are more resilient in times of 
terrorist attacks, thus reinforcing the importance of this study in relation to looking at 
whether emerging markets are more susceptible to shocks than those of the developed 
nations.   
 
Nikkinen and Vahamaa (2010) examined the London index, FTSE100 at the time of 
the New York, London, and Madrid attacks. The authors found that these terrorist 
attacks had strong negative effects on the FTSE100 with an increase in volatility in all 
three events. Brounen and Derwell (2010) examine the effects of terrorist attacks on 
various stock markets in major economies of the world. They find that terrorist attacks 
have only mild negative price effects, rebounding after a week of the event occurring. 
Nations that suffer the terror attacks domestically, experience the most reaction on 
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their stock markets, with the contagion effect having less impact on nations outside 
the attack. Their finding slightly contrasts with other studies, which show significant 
adverse effects.  
 
Kollias et al. (2011) find similar occurrences as Brounen and Derwell did in a study 
the following year. Both studies implement an event study and GARCH methodology 
and found significant negative abnormal returns when analysing the London and 
Madrid bombings on the Spanish capital markets. The reactions of the attacks on the 
London market showed mild reactions, as with Chen and Siems (2004), and Arin et al. 
(2008) earlier studies. In addition, Kollias et al. (2011) find that the market rebound 
was much quicker in London compared to the Spanish markets and that the bombings 
had only a temporary impact on returns and volatility.  
 
Chesney, Reshetar and Kuraman (2011) considers the effects of terrorism attacks on 
25 countries over an 11-year period. Using three methodologies, an event study, 
GARCH methodology, and non-parametric testing, they find that the European and 
American countries tested do in fact show significant negative reactions to a terrorist 
attack. Comparing the three methodologies they determine that the non-parametric 
testing provides the most robust results, especially when measuring market integration 
and spill over effects, yet can be rather complex to undertake.  
 
Further studies have continued to study the impacts of terrorism and the effects on the 
markets outside of Europe and North America. Ramiah, Cam, Calabro, Maher, and 
Ghafori (2010) examined the Australian market and showed significant negative 
effects during September 11 and mild negative effects during the Madrid and London 
bombings. Surprisingly, they also discovered that the Australian markets did not react 
to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India or during the Bali bombings in Indonesia. As 
Australia’s neighbouring country, and with many Australian casualties, the markets 
reacted positively to this bad news. This study highlights that terrorist attacks do not 
necessarily signify negative market reactions but can be positive for a neighbouring 
country despite suffering heavy losses to its citizens. This is something to consider 
when conducting this study along with determining if there has been an increase in 
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market resilience due to terror attacks, which unfortunately, have become all too 
common in society. 
 
4.2.3 Natural Disasters  
Over the past few decades there have been numerous natural catastrophes that have 
broken records in terms of destruction, cost, and unfortunately, fatalities. One of the 
biggest disasters occurred in 2005, as Hurricane Katrina made landfall and caused 
USD$150 billion in damage. (Mahalingam, Coburn, Jung, Yeo, Cooper & Evan 2018) 
Given the scale and unpredictability of a natural disaster occurring, the size, and 
resulting implications to the economy, it has led to an increasing number of studies 
examining the impacts on various markets, although most tend to focus on either 
specific sector such as insurance, construction, and real estate or on a domestic level.  
 
Most of these studies find that natural disasters have a negative effect on market returns 
and markets react to the bad information almost immediately. They use a range of 
methodologies including the GARCH method and event studies, the latter being the 
most common.   (Shelor et al. 1992, Yamori & Kobayashi 2002, Odell & Weidenmier 
2004, Worthington & Valadkhani 2004, Yang et al. 2008, Li 2013, Tao 2014) 
 
Both Angbazo and Narayanan (1996) and Yamori and Kobayashi (1994) examine the 
impact on the insurance industry, in which they find that natural disasters are largely 
negative in terms of property-liability insurers. Angbazo examine the impact on 
Hurricane Andrew in the United States and find large negative effects on insurance 
stocks, which was reduced somewhat by smaller positive effects caused by the 
recouping of some premiums paid insurance holders.  
 
Worthington and Valadkhani (2004) investigated the impact of natural disasters on the 
Australian stock market. Their paper examined daily and accumulated returns from 
1982 to 2002 on and their reaction to 42 natural disasters. They found that earthquakes 




And more recently in 2013, Li (2013) examines the impact of a range of natural 
disasters on the Australian market. Her study uses an event study methodology using 
the data on daily returns of samples firms that are categorized into a variety of 
industries that include insurance, mining, construction, and transportation. She finds 
that natural disasters that occurred in Queensland during 2005-2011 had evident 
negative effects on the Australian equity market with the net effects across industries 
either being positive and/or negative. Furthermore, she found that these effects had 
been felt two days prior to the event which was caused by prior weather disclosures. 
 
Another body of literature that exists with less predominance are studies examining 
the impact of natural disasters on aggregated markets.  (Cutler et al. 1989, Lee et al. 
2007, Ramiah 2013, Ferreria and Karali 2015, Koerniadi et al. 2016) 
They examine numerous natural disasters with their results being reminiscent of those 
found by Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), in which noneconomic newsworthy 
events had a relatively small effect on aggregated stock market returns. Moreover, Lee, 
Wu, and Wang (2007) analysed the contagion effect across international financial 
markets one to three months after the South-East Asia Tsunami in 2004, finding little 
effect during the first month, but over the coming months, reactions were greater.    
 
Ramiah (2013) analysed the effects of the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami 
on world stock markets. They analysed 12 countries to test if international markets 
experienced spill over effects. Their conclusions did not find any significant impact on 
market returns of the equity portfolios examined. In addition, they examined the effects 
five days after the event, to account for any market delays, and found minimal changes 
in returns.  
 
Ferreria and Karali (2015) analyse the impact of the largest 24 earthquakes that 
occurred over the last two decades on the returns to the aggregate stock market indices 
of 35 different financial markets using a GARCH-1 (1,1) model. The model was used 
to investigate the impact of earthquakes on abnormal returns and on stock market 
volatility. The event period was kept relatively small, examining the effects In the 
immediate aftermath of an earthquake occurring, justifying the shorter period as they 
attribute the markets to be relatively efficient and therefore the impact of the 
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Earthquake should be reflected in the stock prices almost immediately. They found 
that the financial markets were rather resilient to earthquakes in 34 out of 35 markets 
over the five days ensuing an Earthquake, with Japan having evidence that domestic 
earthquakes increased the volatility of their financial returns.  
 
And finally, a recent paper by Koerniadi, Krishnamurti and Tourani-Rad (2016) 
examined the impact of natural disasters had upon market returns of several industries. 
They study a range of natural disasters which include Earthquakes, Hurricanes, 
Tornados, Floods, Tsunamis, and Volcanic eruptions, occurring in various developed 
stock markets. Their purpose was to examine the effect of these catastrophes on the 
market returns and specific sectors and whether they are negatively or positively 
affected given the previous literature having various conclusions.  Their analysis finds 
that natural disasters do have a negative effect on certain markets and sectors in which 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornados having a prolonged, negative affect on market 
returns several weeks after the events, whilst other disasters such as floods, tsunami’s 





5 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY & DATA 
5.1 Event Study Methodology 
Today, event studies are a common research method used within the finance and 
economics in which the initial conception that we use today can be attributed to the 
early works of Fama and French (1969) and Ball and Brown (1968).  Their pioneering 
studies have paved the way in a research methodology which has expanded into a rich 
and diverse body of literature which contributes immensely to the understandings and 
implications of economic events and corresponding investment decisions in which 
they effectively examine the hypothesis of whether a market is efficient, or in other 
words, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH).  
An event study, in elementary terms, attempts to investigate and examine whether an 
unanticipated or anticipated event has influenced financial market prices whilst 
ultimately testing whether the market is efficient or inefficient at adjusting to the new 
information quickly. Furthermore, there use can also be to investigate the perceived 
direction and magnitude of an event, along with longevity of such an event upon the 
market, which ultimately tests the market participants confidence and resilience. These 
uses and more are why event studies have become an important tool for researchers 
over the decades and continue to be used in a variety of ways to this very day. 
Early studies in accounting and finance that attest to the importance and significance 
an event study can contribute to academia and the wider community are two papers 
written by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fischer, Jensen, and Roll (1969). These 
revolutionary studies at the time investigated how stock prices adjusted to new 
information to determine whether there was any significance in the events being 
examined. Their findings came off previous literature in the field that examined 
successive price changes, in which there was evidence that independence of price 
changes did coincide with an efficient market, or that financial markets reacted rapidly 
to new information. (Mandelbrot 1966, Samuelson 1965).  
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Ball and Brown’s 1968 paper investigated accounting information of annual income 
releases and how stock market prices reacted to these announcements. They found that 
a negatively perceived announcement, in terms of income forecasting errors, had a 
positive impact on the abnormal returns at the time an annual report was announced.  
A year later, Fama et al. (1969) examined how the market reacted to the news of stock 
splits and found that the announcement of stock splits was quickly absorbed on the 
market, thus indicating that the market adjusted to the new information and therefore 
signalling that the markets were indeed, efficient.  
Following these two groundbreaking studies, there have been an endless abound of 
literature on event studies examining the reaction in the markets to a variety of events, 
be they firm specific events, microeconomic events, or macroeconomic events. The 
possibilities of an event studies scope are only limited to the imagination of the 
researcher with an almost limitless abode of events, factors, and other variables that 
can be examined in an event study.  
The unintended consequence of Fama’s methodology being so effective in many 
circumstances has led to an increasing amount of literature examining the existing 
body of event studies and the importance of a sound framework in which the 
techniques used are reliable and verifiable, given that with other methodologies, there 
are always issues or limitations, and this is no different when conducting an event 
study.  
A paper by Kothari and Warner (2007) examines the econometrics of event studies 
with a focus on the design and statistical properties in conducting this research 
methodology.  Given event studies are so widely used given their simplistic and 
flexible design by the research, they offer commentary on how one should undertake 
a study, relevant to its purpose. and ensuring that we produce a statistical reliable and 
critical event study that can be repeated if necessary.  
Given the flexible nature mentioned previously in conducting an event study and its 
relatively simplistic design and framework, conducting such a study can often differ 
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substantially depending on the research goal and preference of the author. This can 
result in its own challenges and limitations.  After becoming familiar with a wide range 
of methods with extensive reviews on the methodology provided in such papers by 
Binder (1998), Bowman (1983), Corrado (2011), Kothari and Warner (2007) and 
Peterson (1989) with their corresponding analysis and commentary on key papers, we 
find that the framework introduced by Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) will be 
the most appropriate for this study to implement in which we will examine sound 
research questions to test within a framework that considers the limitations that may 
be present. 
Campbell et al. (1997) suggest a seven-step framework in conducting a successful 
event study which includes identifying the event (1),  formulating a selection criterion 
of the firms to be used in the study (2), calculating the normal and abnormal returns 
(3),  identifying an estimation period (4), testing procedure, which are defining the null 
hypothesis, aggregating abnormal returns (5), and then presenting the empirical 
results(6), and interpreting such results with a concluding summary (7).   
The remaining section will delve the first five steps in more detail and how they have 
been implemented in this study and conclude with a detailed description of the data 
used throughout the study.  Regarding steps six and seven, there will be a dedicated 
section in Chapter 6 that will present and interpret the empirical results.  
5.1.1 Step 1. Defining the Event 
 
Firstly, to identify the event, there needs to be an event day or time the news 
announcement or event took place which will be referred to in the analysis as Event 
Day or Day 0.  
 
In an event study analysis, the event date is not necessarily the calendar date that the 
event occurred and as such defining an event date should be based on the research 
questions and target of the study along with the variables and considerations of the 
events selected for the study.  
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For example, Li (2013) defined the event date as the next trading day following a 
natural disaster making landfall. She justified this modification given that natural 
disasters are often unpredictable in terms of damage, loss of life, or specific location 
and therefore delay was almost certain.  Alternatively, other studies select an event 
day immediately following an event such as firm specific events that are easily 
identifiable. (Ball & Brown 1968, Fama et al. 1969)  
 
Accordingly, defining the event date in this study needs to consider these factors and 
for the purpose of this study and the nature of the events examined having a clear date 
in the occurrence and impact, we have selected an event day that will occur on the 
calendar day of the announcement.  Moreover, as we aim to examine the market 
reaction to an event and gauge the market efficiency of an event occurring, be it a 
positive or negative reaction, having an immediate event day is the deemed most 
appropriate.  
 
Another issue to consider when obtaining event dates is to acquire enough events 
whilst minimizing validity and reliability errors. To do this, a selection criterion will 
be needed. Any event that occurs during a national public holiday or other cultural 
event will need to be disregarded, given that the financial markets of that country will 
be closed. Exceptions of this rule will be when closures of the market are a result of 
the event itself, such as the September 11 terror attacks which closed various markets 
around the world as a result.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to determine if there are any events overlapping one 
another or that occur within close proximately to one another which might contaminate 
the sample within the event period or in the estimation window, with the latter being 
discussed later in this section. 
  
If there were an overlap occurring this might alter the findings of the events 
significance due to the added noise and bias from the other event. This might in turn 
provide insights or even a create a Type I or Type II hypothesis error in which we find 
an event to be significant, when without the contaminated event, the significance 
would be absent and vice versa in the other instance.  
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Now that we have accounted for all the above and the event day is determined, we 
must ensure that the accuracy and reliability of each event date used within the analysis 
is correct. Misinterpretation or misreporting of an event date could potentially affect 
the results, especially during a short-period event study where we want to look at a 
small window of time an event occurs and how the markets respond accordingly.  To 
ensure the accuracy of the event date, all events in this study are obtained from 
credible, verifiable, and reliable sources. Each event was cross-checked with multiple 
sources to confidently obtain an accurate event date for each of the 19 
announcements/events selected, see Table 1, using Yahoo Finance, Thomas Reuters 
DataStream, Global Terror Database, along with various news articles and research 
papers.  



















A total of 19 events occurring from 1994 to 2015.  
Seven financial crises, seven terror attacks, and five natural disaster were selected for this study.  
 
 
N Event Category Date 
1 Tequila Crisis Financial Crisis 20/12/1994 
2 Russian Financial Crisis Financial Crisis 02/07/1997 
3 Asian Financial Crisis Financial Crisis 17/08/1998 
4 Dotcom Crash Financial Crisis 19/04/2000 
5 September 11 Attacks Terror Attack 11/09/2001 
6 Bali Bombings Terror Attack 14/10/2002 
7 Madrid Train Bombings Terror Attack 11/03/2004 
8 Indian Ocean Earthquake & Tsunami Natural Disaster 26/12/2004 
9 London Bombings Terror Attack 07/07/2005 
10 Hurricane Katrina Natural Disaster 29/08/2005 
11 Sichuan Earthquake Natural Disaster 12/05/2008 
12 Global Financial Crisis Financial Crisis 15/09/2008 
13 Mumbai Terror Attacks Terror Attack 27/11/2008 
14 Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis Financial Crisis 19/10/2009 
15 Haiti Earthquake Natural Disaster 12/01/2010 
16 Töhoku Earthquake Natural Disaster 11/03/2011 
17 Boston Marathon Bombing Terror Attack 15/04/2013 
18 Chinese Black Monday Crash Financial Crisis 24/08/2015 
19 Bataclan Paris Attacks Terror Attack 13/11/2015 
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Another issue which became apparent during the data collection was the timing of an 
announcement or event being made and determining whether the event occurred 
during the markets opening or not.  Unlike the FOREX markets, which operate 24 
hours a day, the Equities markets which are what the indices are, have a period of daily 
operation and close at a specific time each day. Moreover, as we use aggregated returns 
in terms of the BRICS and G7 nations, we also need to account for the time zones of 
each event and market selected in this study.   
 
This study included several nations that are not geographically near one another which 
in turn means they are also not within the same time zone, with some differences 
between nations being over twelve hours or in other words, one market open on a 
Monday afternoon, with another either closed or open the following day. As such, the 
time difference within certain markets needs to be accounted for as events occurring 
in the US at 2pm during their market’s operational hours, will not be the same for the 
markets in Japan or China, which would be closed.  If this delay is not addressed, the 
flow of information within the markets will contaminate those nations with significant 
time differences, and corresponding results will be either be over or underestimated.  
 
Given this issue, we organised all nations by time-zones and then appropriately cross 
checked with each of the 19 location the events took place.  We then adjusted the 
nations closing price returns based on the immediate trading day the market is open in 
each sampled nation rather than the calendar day of the event announcement.  
 
For example, an event occurring mid-day on June 6th in the US, would be the Event 
Day or Day 0. However, this event would not flow through and be recognised by the 
Japanese markets until opening day of June 7th given the time difference. Therefore, 
to avoid this predicament that could contaminate the results, Japans Event Day or Day 
0 would be June 7th, not June 6th.  As such, all the returns in this study were adjusted 
according to their location and time their markets were open in relation to the time the 
announcement or event occurred.2  
 
                                                 
2 Tables can be provided on request for the time zone and market adjustments 
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After all the necessary steps mentioned above have been completed, with the 19 event 
dates finalised, a successful event study also requires a well-designed event window 
and estimation window as they both have potential to influence the results depending 
on the period selected. (Seiler, 2004)    
 
The event window is the period of trading days preceding and/or following the event 
date and its purpose is to account for any predetermined reactions or delays to an event 
occurring. There is no consensus within the research community on how many days 
will offer the most favourable results as research has various purposes such as research 
questions and scope which require for various research methodology design and 
length. (Seiler 2004)  
As the event period is short in this study and taking into consideration that events are 
absorbed quickly into the market, the choice of alternative options in selecting a 
duration period is limited. The influence that financial events have on the share market 
in which the release and acceptance of information is quicker than ever made easier 
by changes to the market itself such as the use of electronic trading systems and 
algorithms altering how announcements are released to the market reinforce why a 
shorter period would be more suitable for our study. (Seiler 2004)  
Moreover, in relation to natural disasters, the event window should also be relatively 
short to avoid contaminating estimates with confounding factors following an event 
occurring such as those found in earthquake shocks that might affect stock market 
returns. (Ferreira & Karali 2015) 
 
In addition, with the existence of internet communication that facilitates the flow of 
information within seconds, along with intraday trading, reaction of an event occurring 
to the share market reacting to this news is faster than ever, there consensus is that a 
shorter event window is more appropriate with Ferreira and Karali (2015) suggesting 
a five-day window. 
 
Given that we also examine both emerging and developed nations in the sample, along 
with the geographical distance of those selected nations, the event window length at 
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either side of the event day cannot be too short otherwise any delay or leakage of 
information will not be accounted for, thus ruling out a period of one or days either 
side of the event occurring. 
 
After conducting several pilot studies for the event window days, the author selects an 
event window ranging from five days preceding the event to five days after the event 
date taking place, or (-5, +5). This short period should ensure a more powerful test, 
whilst also allowing any information leak or delays that may occur to be accounted 
for. (Seiler 2004) 
 
Information leak, when identifying financial events, comes in the form of pre warning 
events that often occurs when there are predictions or rumours made within the media 
or markets one or two days before an actual event occurs such as an M&A or Earning 
Result Announcement, weather forecast, or even a terror threat.  Ensuring an event 
window a few days before an event occurring ensures the study will account for any 
such leak of information onto the market. If leakage is not accounted for in the event 
study, this may give rise to misinterpretation of the actual effect of the catastrophe, 
causing unintentional bias or errors in the analytical results. 
 
5.1.2 Step 2. Selection Criteria 
 
The selection criteria determine the “firm/s” to be used in the study and can involve a 
lot of decisions in the type of firm used such as the characterises of its operations, 
location, history of prices, public or non-public and so on. This study differs slightly, 
as we examine the national indices, rather than the traditional firm level, along with 
eventually aggregating the indices into two groups, BRICS and the G7. This makes 
the selection criteria rather simplistic given that there are only a set number of 
countries in each category.  
 
The first group that will be examined against the 19 selected events will be the 
emerging nations, specifically, the BRICS nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa. The second group will comprise the top developed nations of the G7 
nations, at the current writing of this paper, are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
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the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. It is important to note that the 
purpose of this study is to not specifically examine nations within the BRICS and G7 
nations and make commentary, but rather examine the leading developed and 
emerging countries at the time of this paper. As such, there are events in the sample 
that occur when the G7 were known as the G8, with Russia being the eighth member, 
up until their expulsion in 2014.   
 
With all twelve nations selected the next step is to identify their market indices that 
will be used to examine the reaction to the various events. These indices, along with 
their corresponding nations can be seen in Table 2.  
Table 2 - The Event Study Nations and Indices 
Indices were chosen based on total coverage of the equities markets in each respective nation. Most of lists indices are self-
explanatory, however India and Japan’s indices in this study are the NIFTY3 and TOPIX4 rather than the SENSEX and Nikkei 
that are often used. We use the NIFTY and TOPIX as the provide greater coverage of the overall market in each nation.  
 
 
5.1.3 Step 3. Measuring Normal and Abnormal Returns 
 
The literature surrounding the calculation of normal and abnormal returns is extensive 
with various methods being developed over the decades, see Table 3.   
 
                                                 
3 NIFTY 500 Index represents about 96.1% of the free float market capitalization of the stocks listed 
on NSE as on March 29, 2019. Source: (National Stock Exchange of India (NSE)) 
4 This is a measure of the overall trend in the stock market, and is used as a benchmark for investment 
in japan stocks. (Source: Japanese Exchnage Group (JPX)) 
N Nation Continent Economy Index 
1 United States of America North America Developed S&P 500 
2 Canada North America Developed TSX Composite 
3 United Kingdom Europe Developed FTSE 100 
4 Japan Asia Developed TOPIX 
5 Germany Europe Developed DAX 30 
6 France Europe Developed CAC 40 
7 Italy Europe Developed FTSE MIB 
8 Brazil South America Emerging IBOVESPA 
9 Russia Europe/Asia Emerging MOEX 
10 India Asia Emerging NIFTY 500 
11 China Asia Emerging Shanghai SE A Share 
12 South Africa Africa Emerging FTSE/JSE 
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To determine the returns of the sample stock would be in the absence of the event, 
normal returns need to be calculated. (Seiler 2004)  
Seiler identifies four different models in the estimation of normal returns. The Mean 
Return model, the Market Return Model, the Proxy Portfolio Return model, and the 
Risk-Adjusted Model or also referred to as the Single-Index market model. 
 
These normal returns are calculated using various models, which over time have had 
additional variations added to the models, especially the Market Model. A study by 
Brown and Warner (1985) look at three models in estimating normal or expected 
returns, which are all statistical models of returns and are derived purely from 
statistical assumptions about the behaviour of returns. These returns models being the 
Mean-Adjusted Returns Model, the Market-Adjusted Return Model, and the Market 
Model. (Dyckman, Philbrick, & Stephen 1984)   
 
The Mean Adjusted Returns model in comparison to the Market model, only requires 
one parameter rather than two that the Market Model requires, along with no market 
returns needed. The returns are calculated by taking the average return for stock i 
during the estimation of an event study and subtracted from the stock’s return during 
the relative event period. (Binder 1998)   
 
The disadvantages of this method however are in the presence of event clustering, 
where the firms in the event study sample have dates that occur within proximity to 
one another. Another problem that this model can have is when a market is either on 
an upwards or downwards trend, the method will consequently create an upwardly or 
downwardly biased estimate. (Seiler 2004) 
  
Overall, this method is relatively good at generating expected returns for stock over an 
event window, given its simplicity. If the sample firms have event dates that are spread 
apart, and the markets are relatively stable this would be a method worth considering. 
However, given the events used in this study are close, advanced methods used to 




The second model, the Market Adjusted Returns model is slightly simpler when 
calculating abnormal returns than the Market Model as it only involves one step and 
not two like the Market Model. If the Market Adjusted Returns method is selected only 
the abnormal returns are estimated during the event period, with no statistical 
parameters needed to be estimated. The Market model on the other hand would first 
require an estimate of parameters and then estimate abnormal returns in a second step. 
(Binder 1998) Furthermore, the model determines that expected firm returns are equal 
to the market return for that period.   
 
And lastly the Market model, which is the most widely used in an event study and has 
many different variations, based on the model theory, determines the return of any 
given security with the return of the market portfolio and follows joint normality of 
asset returns (MacKinley 1997). The model is an improvement over the Mean-
Adjustment Returns Model as it removes some of the return that is related to the 
variation of the markets return. However, this benefit will depend on the R2 of the 
market models regression, as a high R2 value, the higher the variance reduction of 
abnormal returns, resulting in larger gains.   
 
A study by Peterson (1989) discusses another three methods used to calculate 
abnormal returns, which use the market model, but have slight variations. The three 
variations of the Market Model are the Scholes-Williams Test, developed by Scholes 
and Williams in 1977, the Dimson Beta test developed by Dimson in 1979, and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), developed in Sharpe in 1964.  
 
The Scholes- Williams Test is a variation of the popular Market Model and calculates 
beta by using a Scholes-Williams method. (Dyckman et al. 1984)  
The procedure also estimates three OLS regressions using a T daily security returns 
within the estimation period of an event study. (Peterson 1989)  
 
The Dimson Beta Model also uses an alternative technique in estimating beta like the 
Scholes-Williams test.  Dimson (1979) develops a process of estimating parameters 
which avoid potential bias that can occur from using daily returns for securities with 




Moreover, apart for the statistical models mentioned above, there are also economic 
models that can used in event studies which are the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).  
 
CAPM, developed by renowned financial economists William Sharpe and Jack 
Treynor in 1964, is an equilibrium model that accounts risk and return related to the 
stock price and is used to determine an appropriate rate of return on a selected asset.  
 
Whilst the APT developed by Ross in 1976, is an extension of CAPM, which explains 
expected returns of an asset by modelling in linear function within various 
macroeconomic variables.  
Table 3 - Summary of Event Study Returns Models 
  Model Developed by 
Statistical Models    
 1 Mean Adjusted Returns Model Brown & Warner (1985) 
 2 Market Adjust Returns Model Brown & Warner (1985) 
 3 Market Model Fama (1969) 
 4 Scholes-Williams*  Schole, Myron, & J. Williams (1977) 
 5 Dimsen Beta Model* Dimsen, Elroy (1979) 
Economic Models    
 6 CAPM Sharpe & Treynor (1964) 
 7 APT Ross (1976) 
*Variations of the Market Model 
 
 
For this research, the Market Adjusted Returns Model is used, In which the return of 
any given security or index in our case, is subtracted with the return of the market 
portfolio or world index as a benchmark, with any remaining being the abnormal which 
helps the researcher evaluate the impact a certain event has on the stock market.  
 
However, to complete this calculation, the normal return, or the expected return as it 
can be referred as, needs to be calculated. This considering that the abnormal return is 
the actual return of a firm’s stock price minus the normal return of the firm over the 
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event window. Therefore, the normal or expected return can be expressed through the 
following formula. (Brown & Warner 1985, MacKinlay 1997, Corrado 2011)  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡  (1) 
 
With 𝑅𝑖𝑡 representing a national index, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 representing the global index, in this 
case, MSCI ACWI Index.  
 
Given the nature of this study the author modifies the market adjusted model given 
that instead of a firm or given security this study is implements indices. Moreover, as 
the model also implements an index to benchmark against a firms/securities return, we 
also must modify accordingly. We use a world benchmark, MSCI AC World (ACWI) 
Index which covers 84% of global equities markets and therefore makes an appropriate 
benchmark for this studies purpose.  
 
Furthermore, given that this study implements numerous events and national indices, 
the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) needs to be calculated to determine the 
significance for the whole sample per event, along with AARs for all events per 
financial crises, terror attacks, and natural disasters categories and as such is calculated 
as: 
 









Where 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡 is the Average Abnormal Return at date t, with 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 the Actual Return 
for index i at date t.  
 
Moreover, Abnormal Returns are not significant enough to give a picture on the 
significance of an event occurring over a period, as the event period is over 11-days (-
5 to +5), the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) should also be calculated to 










Which is the sum of all Abnormal Returns (ARs) over the 11-day period for index i at 
dates t  
 
As with Abnormal Returns, with the study examining multiple events and indices, the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) are also calculated to determine the 
events significance across all indices and all events within a given event category.  The 
CAARs are calculated as follows:  
 









With the average of the samples total CARs being taken at index i 
 
5.1.4 Step 4. Defining the Estimation Procedure Period 
Once the event date, event period, and returns and abnormal returns have been 
determined, the estimation window needs to be constructed. As with the rest of the 
framework, the estimation period is rather flexible and there is no consensus on an 
exact duration and left to the researcher’s discretion. The estimation can either before 
the event window, during the event window or after the event window, however, 
common practise is to have the estimation period before the event and event window 
to obtain a sample of returns that are deemed normal, without a significant event 
occurring within it. This is done so the abnormal returns we are testing can be used in 
conjunction with the estimation sample to determine whether our returns are indeed 
abnormal or expected.  
The underlying motivation that the estimation period should not overlap the event 
window is that any overlap carries the potential risk of influencing the estimates of 
how the stock prices react when the event is not present. If these two periods did in 
fact intersect, there would be a contamination effect. (Seiler 2004)  
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However, the critical aspect is minimizing the overlap of the chosen event with other 
finance events that might produce a biased result, therefore again justifying while this 
study should implement a short event window and estimation period. 
In retaining the tests power/strength whilst also remaining reliable and effective, a 
relatively short estimation period of 95 days will be selected, being -6 days to -100 
days. With the 95-day period preceding the event window, this is under a year used in 
most research or specifically 252 trading days. This adoption is to reduce some of the 
issues mention in the event selection criteria in minimizing cross contamination within 
event windows and estimation periods with conflicting events.   
Now that the specified event window (-5 to +5), Event Days (Day 0), along with an 
estimation period of 95 days (-6 to -100), we have the complete event study timeframe 















5.1.5 Step 5. Testing the Framework of Abnormal Returns 
Now that the event windows, estimation period, abnormal returns and cumulative 
returns, we need to test abnormal returns against the chosen hypotheses in this paper 
to determine any statistical significance.  
                                                 
5 Source: the author 
Figure 2 - Event Period Timeline 
  t2 
  t3 
  4 
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Using a parametric test is deemed more appropriate in this study given the nature and 
scope of the study in which the t-statistic will satisfactorily measure the significance 
of abnormal returns. Although other nonparametric returns such as the Sign Test, Rank 
test and Patell tests, are also good indicators of significance but are more complex in 
implemented. (Corrado 1989)  
The Hypothesis to be tested for each event category, financial crisis, terror attacks, and 
natural disasters, will be as follows:  
Null Hypothesis H0: (Financial Crisis/Terror Attack/Natural Disaster) events 
have no impact on the BRICS and/or G7 nations market returns. 
 
Alterative Hypothesis H1: (Financial Crisis/Terror Attack/Natural Disaster) 
events do have an impact on the BRICS and G7 nations market returns.  
Testing these with a Null Hypothesis of 𝐻0: 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 0 we use the t-statistic to calculate 







Where S.E is the Standard Error equal to: 
 





[∑ (𝑥𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑁−1
𝑖=0 (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)
2]







Where x is a nations index and y the world benchmark of the sample means average 
(known_x’s) and average (known_y’s), and n is the sample size. 
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Consequently, we then test the Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) with the t-statistic 






















Since we also calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) along with the 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), their respective t-statistics will also 
be calculated.  






































   
(11) 
 
All the t- statistics in this study will use the generally accepted significance levels of 
10%, 5% and 1% in which the absolute values of these levels are greater than or less 
than +/-1.645, +/-1.96, and +/-2.54 respectively according to the Normal distribution 
table and are marked in the summary tables which are in the Appendices as *, **, or 
***.  
 
A significant finding infers that markets have a reaction to a major catastrophe and 
therefore we reject the Null Hypothesis at a certainty of the corresponding significance 
level.   
 
Once the significance of all four abnormal returns are calculated (AR, AAR, CAR, 
CAAR), the final two steps in conducting an event study takes place which are the 
interpretation of empirical results and commentary. These two steps will be discussed 
in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2 Description of Data 
 
5.2.1 Returns  
The returns for this study are obtained using the various national market indexes listed 
in Table 4. The data was obtained using Thomas Reuters DataStream for all but 
Brazil’s Index, which was obtained via Yahoo Finance given the Indices unavailability 
on DataStream.  Moreover, an important aspect to clarify in relation to obtaining the 
data via Yahoo Finance is the reliability of the data. There have been known instances 
that have identified issues in data validity and the absence of returns when a holiday 
occurs or Yahoo Finance not considering the calendars of other nations and primarily 
using the US calendar which results in missing data etc. As such, the author manually 
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cleaned and validated the data by manually checking the returns for official holiday’s 
and adjusting by taking the previous two days and averaging it for the missing day.  
All returns obtained were the adjusted close price rather than the close price. The 
adjusted price accounts for stock splits and dividends and is considered by the wider 
academic community to be the most appropriate returns in these types of studies.  
The returns for the equity indices are calculated in DataStream by calculating an 
aggregate sector and market price indices, along with any associated aggregations such 
as sector price/earnings ratio (PE) and dividend yield (DY). 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡−1 ∗
∑ (𝑃𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑡)
𝑛
1





Where, 𝐼𝑡 is the index value on day t, 𝐼𝑡−1 is the index value on previous working day, 
𝑃𝑡 is the unadjusted price on day t, 𝑃𝑡−1 is the unadjusted price on previous day t, 𝑁𝑡 
is the number of shares in issue on day t, 𝑓 is the adjustment factor for capital action 
occurring on day t, and 𝑛 is the number of constituents in index.  
Furthermore, the sector and market aggregates are weighted by market value and are 
calculated using the representative list of shares. 𝐾𝑃𝐼0 
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑡−1










Where, KPI is regional price index, MV is country market value, PI is country price 
index, and ER is the country exchange rate to US dollars. 
 










Where, the logarithmic form ln of returns on current trading day t are divided by the 
logarithmic form ln of the previous trading day’s returns t-1. 
 
5.2.2 Market Exchanges & Benchmark  
 
This study selected the major stock indices that covered most of the equities market in 
each of their respective markets to gain a holistic overview of an events effect on a 
nation’s capital market. All indices were obtained via DataStream, except for Brazil, 
which Index returns were acquired via Yahoo Finance with the list of all the indices 
used in this study and information of their respective markets are presented in Table 
4.  
 
As this study implements a Market-Adjusted Model, an appropriate index is needed to 
determine normal and abnormal returns. In a usual firm level event study, the market 
index of that firm’s nation is used, whereas on a simplistic study which exams a nations 
market response to multiple events, the S&P 500 is often used given the importance 
of the index on world markets. However, as thus study examined a range of events to 
test the reaction on the emerging and developed markets, a benchmark needs to 
appropriately cover the response of all economic markets.  
 
We determine that the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) is implemented as the 
benchmark for this study as it represents a large opportunity set of large and medium-
cap stocks in 23 developed6 and 27 emerging7 markets. Furthermore, it covers an 
approximate 85% of free float adjusted market capitalization in each market which we 
believe is an appropriate benchmark for the scope of this study.  
                                                 
6 23 developed nations of: Americas: Canada, United States: Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom; Asia; Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore; Pacific; Australia, New Zealand. 
7 27 emerging nations of: Americas: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru; Europe: Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Russia; Middle East: Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia; 




Table 4 - National Indices & Benchmark Summary 
Nation Exchange Abbrev. Index  Market Cap Data Availability 
Brazil BM&F  BOVESPA iBOVESPA $804.11B 27/04/1993 
Canada Toronto Stock Exchange  TSX Canada S&P/TSX Toronto Stock Market Index $2.2Tr 24/05/1979 
China Shanghai Stock Exchange SSE Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite:  $4.39Tr 02/01/1992 
France Euronext Paris  CAC 40 Index  $1.83Tr 09/07/1987 
Germany Deutsche Borse Group  FSX Deutsche Boerse AG German Stock Index $2.11Tr 24/05/1979 
India Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange  BSE S&P BSE SENSEX Index  $2Tr 02/01/1991 
Italy Borsa Italiana MTA FTSE MIB (Milano Italia Borsa) Index N/A 31/12/1997 
Japan Tokyo Stock Exchange JPX Japan Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX) $3.69Tr 24/05/1968 
Russia Moscow Exchange MICEX Moscow Exchange MICEX-RTS PJSC $646.85B 22/09/1997 
South Africa Johannesburg Stock Exchange JSE FTSE/JSE Africa Top40 Tradable Index $988.34B 29/06/1995 
United Kingdom London Stock Exchange LSE UK FTSE 100 Stock Market Index $4.24Tr 30/12/1983 
United States New York Stock Exchange NYSE S&P 500 Index $24.22Tr 24/05/1979 
World Benchmark  N/A N/A MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) $56.21Tr 24/05/1979 
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5.2.3 Event Selection  
 
This study examines a total of 19 events with the earliest occurring in 1992 (Tequila 
Crisis) and most recent in 2015 (Chinese Black Monday Crash). A summary of all 
events used in this study that includes a short description of each event can be found 
in Table 5. 
 
Dates of each event was obtained by cross-checking with numerous media articles, 
insurance, and government reports, along with prior literature on these events.  
 
Furthermore, terrorist attacks and data associated with this in the literature were 
obtained from The Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This database is open sourced 
and includes information on terror events globally from 1970 to present and included 
over 190,000 terror incidents.  
 
Events selected were based on significance and impact on the global arena in which 
all events had a financial or socially devastating impact on multiple nations. All 
financial crises selected had a large impact on a variety of regions for a prolonged 
period, with two financial flash crashes also included, given the large losses they had 
on global markets and unexpected nature.  
 
Furthermore, terror attacks were selected based on major attacks, which at the time 
were unprecedented in those regions. Nations that experience regular attacks become 
accustom to such attack according to prior research which has shown those regions 
and their markets largely remain unaffected.  
 
In addition, domestic terrorism, which is when there is a targeted attack on a local 
population, government institute, or making a political statement were not selected for 
this study, as these events will primarily affect the local market of that country targeted 
rather than on a global level.   
 
Finally, natural disaster events were chosen based on the destructive nature of the 
event, and the resulting costs and loss of life.   
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Table 5 - Summary of the Events Examined 
 Event Name Event Description Category Day Month Year 
1 Tequila Crisis The Central Bank of Mexico devalues the Peso Financial Crisis 20 Dec 1994 
2 Asian Financial Crisis Thailand devalues its currency to the USD Financial Crisis 02 Jul 1997 
3 Russian Financial Crisis Russia devalues the ruble, ruble bounds against the US can widen Financial Crisis 17 Aug 1998 
4 Dotcom Bubble New York’s NASDAQ, main market for tech firms, plunged 7%  Financial Crisis 19 Apr 2000 
5 September 11 Terror Attacks Two planes hit the World Trade Centres in NYC Terror Attack 11 Sep 2001 
6 Bali Bombings On Saturday 12th October three bombs explode in Bali killing 202, injuring 209  Terror Attacks 14 Oct 2002 
7 Madrid Train Bombings Multiple explosions on public transport kill 193 and injury 3000 Terror Attacks 11 Mar 2004 
8 Boxing Day Tsunami At 7:58am local, a 9.1 magnitude earthquake and tsunami hit the coasts of Asia  Natural Disaster 26 Dec 2004 
9 London Bombings At 8:50am local, series of bombs on public transport kill 56, injuring 784 Terror Attacks 07 Jul 2005 
10 Hurricane Katrina What would be the costliest Hurricane makes landfall in the US   Natural Disaster 29 Aug 2005 
11 Sichuan Earthquake At 2:28 local, an 8 magnitude earthquake rocks Sichuan, killing 84,000 Natural Disaster 12 May 2008 
12 Global Financial Crisis Lehman Brothers collapses and sends markets into a freefall  Financial Crisis 15 Sep 2008 
13 Mumbai Terror Attacks Terrors attack the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, resulting in 166 dead, +300 injured Terror Attacks 27 Nov 2008 
14 Eurozone Financial Crisis Greece admits budget deficit double than previously estimated, or 12% of GDP Financial Crisis 19 Oct 2009 
15 Haiti Earthquake A 7 magnitude Earthquake hits Haiti at 4:53pm local, killing +250,000 Natural Disaster 12 Jan 2010 
16 Tōhoku Earthquake & Tsunami A 9.1 Earthquake & Tsunami hits Japan & causes a subsequent nuclear meltdown  Natural Disaster 11 Mar 2011 
17 Boston Marathon Bombings At 2:49pm, two bombs detonate near the finish line of the marathon killing 3 Terror Attacks 15 Apr 2013 
18 Chinese Black Monday Crash Shanghai’s SE index plunged by 8.5%, causing the Chinese markets to collapse Financial Crisis 24 Aug 2015 
19 Bataclan Paris Attacks Coordinated terror attacks in Paris killed 130, injuring a further 416 Terror Attacks 13 Nov 2015 
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5.2.4 Data Validity 
 
To avoid data validity issues and given that event studies need to have a period which 
account for all sample data, market closures in each respected country will need to be 
accounted for and then omitted from the analysis to ensure all nations are subjected to 
the same period. All events and market returns were obtained from reliable sources 
used in the wider literature.  
 
5.2.5 Data Limitations  
 
This study acknowledges that there are some limitations and unanticipated occurrences 
during the research that may affect the studies outcomes.  
 
Firstly, the very nature of financial crises dictates that there is not one single event 
with the duration of a financial crisis lasting months, or even years. The “key” event 
day that was selected, was an event that according to previous literature and reactions 
around the world, was a significant negative event that would ultimately change the 
course of the financial crisis. However, by selecting a key event, this by no means 
dictates that there were no other events prior or after, that may have contributed to the 
possibility of noise in the datasets, such as the estimation window.   
 
Furthermore, this study implemented a uniform event period of 11-days to gauge the 
market reaction across the entire event sample. However, given that financial crises, 
terror attacks, and natural disasters have unique and challenging circumstances, which 
include the duration of a certain event being prolonged or delayed. For example, Li 
(2013) attributes a later event day, after the calendar day, given that natural disasters 
take time to process on the market with mixed or inadequate levels of information 
available during this event.  
 
Other limitations are within the market efficiency theory itself. As previously stated in 
the literature, over time, terror attacks have been shown to have reduced negative 
impacts on the markets have begun, some would say, to price this into the market in 
forms of risk.   
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Moreover, the limitations of the event study itself and possible anomalies seen with 
the literature. As the event study methodology depends on the assumption of an 
efficient market hypothesis. However, if this theory is not valid, as in the length of 
time required for individual investors to respond to event signals is random and 
therefore, the implication is that markets could exhibit market inefficiencies because 
prices do not instantly or fully reflect all available information. 
 
Secondly, a failure to consider many other effects and variables of the event and 
therefore might lead to contamination by ensuing events. E.g., with the Earthquake 
and Tsunami in Japan, days later a nuclear meltdown occurred which could have 
contributed to the downturn in Japan and not the natural disaster itself. Whilst, 
concurrent events in different stocks might weaken or reinforce one another, resulting 
in abnormal returns that are not caused by the specific event of interest. 
 
Lastly, event studies are sensitive to changes in a research design, and therefore results 
will vast differently depending on all the variables chosen in the event study 




6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter analyses the market performance of the G7 and BRICS nations during 19 
events within three categories of past Financial Disasters, Terrorist Attacks, and 
Natural Disasters. The 19 events examined include seven financial crises, seven terror 
attacks, and five natural disasters spanning a period from 1994 to 2015. The study 
implements the Event Study Methodology with a Market Adjusted Model applied for 
calculating the Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
along with the corresponding Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) and Cumulative 
Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) using the indices of each of the 12 nations 
against the MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) as the market benchmark.  
 
For brevity, the paper will primarily focus on the AARs and CAARs given the scope 
of this paper. It is important to highlight that to obtain the AARs and CAARs, the ARs 
and CARs of each individual nation within each economic group, were calculated. 
With the UK, US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy’s ARs and CARs 
calculated to obtain the AARs and CAARs of the G7. Alternatively, Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa’s ARs and CARs were used in calculating AARs and 
CAARs for the BRICS bloc.   The CARs charts for all financial crises, terror attacks, 
and natural disasters have been included in Appendix A to provide the reader insight 
into how each event affected each nations index used in this study.  
 
Furthermore, the AARs and CAARs, along with the parametric statistical t-statistics 
are presented in Appendix A, again for those that wish to examine the statistical 
implications in more detail. 
 
Lastly, in terms of the organisation of the empirical findings and corresponding 
commentary and interpretation, this Chapter will be divided into three subsections 
based on the three categories of events examined. Those being, Financial Crises, 
Terror Attacks, and Natural Disaster. In addition, each subsection will discuss the 
overall findings of the reactions to each category and the reactions on the BRICS and 
G7 nations with additional commentary of individual events that had significant 
findings or contributed to the overall reaction of the grouping of nations reactions to 
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an event category. Which will correspond with the AAR and CAARs charts for each 
category of catastrophise to present the data visually. Given the among of analysis 
conducted, the full statistical analysis of each individual event in the form of the AAR 
and CAAR summary tables along with the t-statistics which highlight the significant 
findings in all 19 events have been included in Appendix B for the reader’s benefit.    
 
6.1 Financial Crisis Implications on the G7 and BRICS Economies 
 
The seven financial disaster events examined in this paper include the Tequila Crisis 
of 1994, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Russian Financial Crisis in 1998, the 
Dotcom Crash of 2000, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008, The Eurozone 
Sovereign Debt Crisis at the end of 2009, and the Chinese Black Monday Crash in 
2015. 
 
By examining the ARs, AARs, CARs, and CAARs we find that the nations 
domestically affected by each financial crisis demonstrate the most significance in 
terms of negative returns along with statistical significance, except for the United 
States during the Global Financial Crisis. Moreover, it has been shown over time, the 
contagion effect of each corresponding crisis has increased, with more nations outside 
the domestic region of those affected showing signs of statistically significant 
reactions to the various economic pitfalls and crisis’ over the last three decades 
examined. Which are in line with studies by Brown and Warner (1985), Schoder and 
Vankudre (1986), Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987),  
Bekiros (2014).  
 
In relation to the developed and emerging nations, the emerging economies of the 
BRICS experience the most impact in terms of significance on the movements within 
their respective national stock markets, along with a sustained duration in comparison 
to the developed nations. This raises questions of whether the market is efficient in 
emerging markets with the results indicating that emerging markets are slower to react 
to new information and experience high levels of sporadic volatility which may 




Although, the results also indicate that the levels of shock on national indices have 
decreased over time in terms of the ARs examined, with the duration and volatility 
during the five days preceding and five days ensuing a significance negative financial 
event, lessening over time. This leads us to believe that markets ability to react to new 
information has improved over time, with market confidence of those market 
participants being more favourable in recent years than in the previous two decades. 
This finding would therefore, favour market efficiency, as Fama and McKinley 
indicate that daily returns are good indicators of the garnering the market’s reaction to 
new information, and this seems to concur that over time the market have reacted to 
historic patterns. One might assume that as markets have become more interconnected, 
regardless of their economic status, the ability to share new information and more 
importantly, reliability of that information has contributed to the emerging markets 
being more efficient than had previously been possible. 
Relating to the AARs of all financial crises, which aggregate abnormal returns across 
all seven financial crises within the BRICS and G7 nations, shown in Figure 3, both 
economic blocs had relatively small levels of volatility in relation to those seven 
financial crises examined over the three decades. However, in terms of significance, 
the BRICS nations did demonstrate a rather volatile trend compared with the G7’s 
rather flat period in the 11-day period examined. Furthermore, you can see that the 
BRICS nations were particularly volatile pre-event period, which signifies that 
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Figure 3 - AARs of All Financial Crises 
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Moreover, on the day of key negative announcement, Event Day 0, the G7 nations had 
relatively minor response overall with a drop of -0.27% on the Event Day, which was 
quickly recouped on Day +1 and followed by a rather uneventful trend pattern across 
the AARs and CAARs of the seven financial crises examined.  In contrast, the BRICS, 
experienced a sharp decline to negative announcements on Day 0, which continued to 
drop on to Day +1, as investors having lost confidence in the market and the financial 
stability of the region. It took 4 days after the event for emerging markets to regain 
into positive territory.  
Of the seven financial disasters examined, which can be seen in Figure 4, the BRICS 
nations had the most negative reactions on their national indices except for the 
Eurozone crisis, which surprisingly had a prolonged positive reaction during this 
event.  There was uniform negativity in relation to an events announcement across the 
BRICs and G7 bloc of nations leading up to the Event Day 0, with statistical 
significance at the 10% and 5% levels for the Russian Financial Crisis, Dotcom Crash, 
GFC, and Black Monday Crash in China. Furthermore, statistical significance is 
greater for the BRICS nations in which they also recoup slower than the G7 over the 
11-period event window examined in this study. Which as mentioned before, might 
attribute to the inefficiencies and instabilities of emerging markets.   
Delving into the BRICS markets in more detail, Russia displayed the most reaction on 
average with a high level of volatility to most financial disasters within the sample of 
events. The most significant of which can be attributed to the high levels of negative 
returns during the Russian Crisis, which aligns with the literature that an event 
occurring domestically has greater impact on the market. There was also significant 
activity during the GFC.  Returns significantly declined over multiple days before both 
event days at a significance level at the 1% level with returns far exceeding -15%, 
contributing to the statistical significance of all financial within the BRICS group of 
nations.  
Alternatively, The G7 nations had relatively stable levels of returns within an overall 
range between -2% to +2% across all seven financial crises. This somewhat 
demonstrates that the developed economies examined were more resilient during those 
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financial disasters along with the markets reacting to negative news immediately 
which show that the confidence of the financial stability of those markets were able to 
recover faster than those of the BRICS. Again, this aligns with previously discussed 
literature in this paper that market participant confidence is a key factor in why the 
events occurring in emerging nations had more of an impact and spread rapidly across 
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Furthermore, examining the CAARs of the BRICS and G7 across all financial crisis 
events, Figure 5 indicates that the average reaction to negative announcements made 
in relation to a financial crisis, saw developed nations faring substantially better and 
were considerably more resilient, having the least impact on their financial markets 
than their emerging nation counterparts. Furthermore, market volatility and the extent 
of a significant negative economic event occurring was also minimal in the developed 
nations. As the chart shows, on Event Day, the BRICS nations had a negative reaction 
to the announcement with a peak downturn on three days after the events occurring, 
only showing signs of recovery thereafter. This result significantly impacted the 
overall sample of all nations as seen in the grey line of the chart. This is important for 
investment diversification, as many portfolios have a combination of both developed 
and emerging markets, which in this instance, would mean an overall negative effect 
to a balanced economic portfolio during a financial crisis. Although we do 
acknowledge that risk is already priced in given that emerging markets greater returns 








Having a closer examination of each financial crisis and the reaction of the BRICS and 
G7 to each announcement dates, there seems to be a clear indication that the developed 
nations were relatively stable, with minimal signs of volatility than those of the 
BRICS. During the Tequila Crisis, Russian Crisis, Asian Crisis, Dotcom Crash. Global 
Financial Crisis, both the developed and emerging countries experienced similar 
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Figure 6 - CAARs of All Financial Crises 
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During the Tequila Crisis, the developed nations had a relatively mild positive reaction 
in contrast with the BRICS nations which saw a decline from two days prior to event 
day which continued until three days after the event, with a short one-day increase 
followed again by decreases ending at day +5 with an average CAR of -6%. No 
statistical significance was found. Prior research on financial calamities of the early 
1980’s, such as studies undertaken by Fama, show the financial crises occurring in 
Latin American had a level of contagion that was mainly restricted to their 
geographical location along with those nations that had a well-established trading 
partnership at that time, which in those days was not as globally connected as we see 
today.  
Similar findings were found during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 with this study 
finding no statistical significance within the G7 nations over the 11-day period, 
whereas the BRICS nations had an adverse reaction starting on the Event Day 0 which 
carried throughout the five corresponding days. The emerging economies reacted 
heavily to the events in South-East Asia with China and Japan contributing to the 
market drops on Event Day 0. China had the most significance at the 1% level, with 
Japan at the 10% and 5% levels.  
 
Moreover, China’s CARs in percentage terms were relatively high throughout the 
period, ranging from -4% up to -19.65% on day +3 whereas Japan had significantly 
less with -4% or below. However, statistically, there were no levels of significance and 
the author may attribute this to the sampled nations examined where the crisis 
predominantly affected South-East Asia that had close trading ties rather than those of 
the North-West nations of China and Japan. This result is significant in terms of 
examining the difference between two nations that are geographical close, within the 
area the financial crisis originated, but differ in terms of economic status and 
development at the time. The reaction to the event and the relatively smaller reaction 
show that the developed economy of Japan weathered the crisis more efficiently than 
China. This finding is in line with past literature that emerging countries are more 




Moreover, in terms of the financial events that had the most significance was the 
Russian Financial Crisis which occurred one year after the Asian Crisis, and The GFC 
a decade later and saw both developed and emerging nations negatively affected. 
Although, as with the previous crises, the emerging economies fared worse.  The 
Russian Financial Crisis showed large levels of statistical significance across the G7 
and BRICS bloc of nations, with the BRICS nations having the most reaction to 
Russia’s currency devaluation compared with much of the EU nations in this study. 
Russia suffered substantially, suffering as high as -41.50% (day +4) with statistical 
significances throughout days -4 to -2 and +2 to +5 at the 1% level far exceeding t-
statistical values of over.  This aligns with the literature that domestic reactions are far 
greater in terms of volatility and market reaction. Moreover, all emerging nations 
except India, recorded heavy losses over the 11-day period with high levels of 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.  
 
Conversely, the only significant market reaction to the Russian crisis in the developed 
sample, was Canada. The North American nation had significance prior to the event 
day -4 at 1% significance, and at the 5% and 10% levels from +3 days until +5 days. 
Although after further research, Canada was also experiencing a decline in banking 
stocks, with the uncertainty of the Russian crisis adding to investor sentiment and 
therefore, the author attributes in part to this result. 
Leading into the new millennium, the Dotcom Crash, as with previous financial 
calamities in this study, the emerging nations being adversely affected and at a more 
substantial, but not statistically significant level. Alternatively, the G7 had relatively 
positive CAAR returns over the period with significance three days prior to the event 
day. The US, Canada, and the UK suffered minor reactions at the 10% level of 
significance three days prior to the event day, although the CAR percentages were 
small at approximately 2-3%. Whereas Germany and France had no statistical 
significance across the period.  
In relation to the BRICS nations, Brazil and South Africa had negative reactions to the 
event, with Brazil’s statistical significance at the 10% level prior to the event day and 
South Africa’s at the 1% level. Moreover, India’s Nifty Index dropped dramatically 
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throughout the event window, beginning at two days prior at -6% at level of 
significance of 10% and continuing to drop to -21.21% on day +4 with an end to the 
period with a slight sign of a recovery on day +5 with -16%.  Surprisingly, Russia was 
the only exception with no statistical significance within the event window period 
Following onto the next decade, the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 would 
become one of the most prolific financial disaster since the Great Depression. It was 
therefore no surprise that there were significant levels of volatility across a range of 
statistical significance within the BRICS and G7 nations.  The emerging group of 
nations had an overall negative reaction to the events in the US with levels of 
significance at the 1% level and all continued along a negative trend until three days 
after with sharp jump into positive territory on Day +3.  
Brazil, Russia, India, and China all experienced negative reactions throughout the 
event window, with Brazil having a statistical significance five and four days prior to 
the event day which they were able to regain much of those losses over the coming 
trading days. Conversely, Russia suffered significant cumulative declines over the 
entire period at a 1% level of significance over Days -4 to -2, and Days 0 to +5, with 
a loss greater than -31.78% three days after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  
These results yet again demonstrate that emerging nations suffer significantly in times 
of a financial calamities with prolonged exposure compared with the developed 
economies in the sample. The G7 nations were relatively calm over the 11-day period, 
with minimal reactions in terms of significance, except for a few days prior to the 
Event Day in which Canada had significance at the 1% level, UK at the 5% level, and 
France and Italy at the 10% level. Moreover, the US suffered the least in terms of 
CARs with no statistical significance along with small declines not exceedingly more 
than 2% throughout the examined event period. The findings show that no matter 
whether it was the emerging or developed nations, investors would have gained little 
from diversification during the scope of this calamity which aligns with the findings 
of Bartram and Bodnar (2009), and Dooley and Hutchinson (2009). 
81 
 
Now interesting, the last two financial crises that were examined in this study had 
rather surprisingly findings, in terms of the emerging economies faring fair better 
during the Eurozone Crisis than the G7, whilst the crash of the markets in China led to 
an initial drop across all regions to then see the G7 sharply return to positive territory 
the following day and flattening during the remainder of the period.  
During the Eurozone Sovereign Credit, the G7 nations had a continual decline across 
the period in reaction to Greece’s announcement of a black hole in their budget which 
would ultimately send the European markets into freefall. But despite that, there was 
no significance across the G7 or any seven nations within the economic group. In 
contrast to the decline in the G7 nation states, the BRIC nations over the 11-day period 
experienced a persistent upward trend, with a sharp spike on Day +3, but with no levels 
of significance.  
Lastly, on Monday the 24th of August 2015, a flash crash in the Chinese markets 
surprised the market with a significant amount of activity in all major markets around 
the globe.  As the markets in Shanghai tumbled, this was quickly absorbed by all 
markets, with an average decline in the G7 and BRICS for the trading day. Germany, 
France, and Italy had slight negative reactions on Event Day 0 with CARs of -3.52%, 
2.83%, and -3.37% respectively. However, this was swiftly reversed on Day 1, with 
the G7 regaining the loss of the previous trading day, leaving no evidence of any 
statistical significance in the developed nation sample.  
Contrarywise, China experienced a significant downturn across the event period 
examine. With dramatic declines on Day 0 with significance at Day -4 at the 10% level 
whilst Days 0 to +5 were all statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level. In terms 
of a contagion or spill-over in the surrounding region, there was minimal evidence of 
contagion in India and South Africa with both nations reacting positively on Event 
Day 0 with South Africa having a significance level of 1%. Russia and Brazil also had 
positive gains throughout the period, with Brazil having a CAR as high as 6% on Day 
+4 with a mixture of statistical significances of 1%, 5% and 10%. Interesting, Japan, 
a developed nation, reacted negatively to the event with CARS within the -4% to -5% 
range between day 0 and day +5 with significance across Day 1 to day 3.  
82 
 
6.2 How the G7 and BRICS Markets React to Terrorist Attacks  
 
 
The seven terror attacks examined in this paper include September 11 terror attacks in 
2001, Bali Bombings in 2002, Madrid Train Bombings in 2004, London Bombings in 
2005, Mumbai Taj Mahal Palace Attacks in 2008, Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013, 
and Bataclan Paris attacks in 2015. 
 
Examining Figure 7, we find that in relation to AARs, the developed nations have an 
initial negative response to terror attacks in which those nations directly affected suffer 
the most, whilst other nations within the G7 suffer similar effects on their markets. 
Interesting, the BRICS nations experience a slight delay, with a sharp drop on Day +1.  
Moreover, both the BRICS and G7 economies experience small levels of volatility 
days after the attacks as returns move back into positive territory on Day+2 but fall 












Examining the CAARs of all the terror attacks in Figure 8, paints a clearer picture at 
the accumulated movement across the 11-day period. There is a clear indication that 
all markets react negatively to a terror attack, with the BRICS nations having a 
considerably worse reaction than those of the G7 and for a prolonged period.  
However, over the sampled seven events and across the BRICS and G7, there was no 









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
All Terror Attacks
G7 BRICS ALL

















Furthermore, as we examine each terror attack inflicted in the sample, there seems to 
be no correlation or pattern in terms of market activity across BRICS and G7 and as 
such each event will be analysed separately as we discuss the AARs and CAARs for 
each terror attack shown in Figures 9 and 10 at the conclusion of this section’s 
commentary.  
 
6.2.1 September 11  
 
As discussed in the previous literature, the number of studies examining terror attacks 
increased significantly after September 11, which saw the worst attack on the West in 
recent memory. During this unprecedented event, the G7 nations in terms of AARs 
had an initial negative reaction on Event Day with most markets rebounding on Day 
+1, which was followed by a further drop on Day +3 by 2%. Moreover, the BRICS 
nations saw a delay to the event with a significant decrease on Day +1. The terror 
attack led all nations to a negative spiral after the event day, with some level of 
recovery on day +4. This event had statistical significance for the G7 nations at the 1% 
from Event Day up until the end of the selected period of Day +5, whereas there was 
less statistical significance for the BRICS at the 10% level on Days +1 and +5, at the 
5% level on Days +2 and +4, and the 1% on Day +3.  
 
Moreover, the CAARs saw The G7 having the most severe reaction to the event with 
the European nations of Germany and Italy having statistical significance from Day 0 
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on Days +1 and +2. Interestingly, the US or Canada showed no statistical significance 
with CARs in the positive region of 2-3% after the event occurring. These results, we 
believe, may be because of the markets closure for the rest of the week in the US and 
Canada. Because of this anomaly, the study in the future should use a greater event 
window to attribute this phenomenon.  In terms of the emerging economies, Brazil and 
India had negative reactions, with Brazil at the 1% significant level over the five days, 
whilst India having 5%. Russia and South Africa had no statistical significance, 
whereas China had positive CARs throughout the 11-day period, climbing to as much 
as 8.93% on day +5 with 1% statistical level.  
 
6.2.2 Bali Bombings 
 
The second terror attacks occurred in Bali in which several bombs tore through the 
busy tourism district, which was originally targeted towards American nationals, but 
resulted in the deaths of primarily Australian and British tourists along with local 
Indonesians. The AARs obtained show a rather volatile period with a relatively large 
shock to the BRICS markets on Day +1, followed by a steep correction the following 
day.  This falls in line with previous papers of Carter and Simkins (2004), Chen and 
Siems (2004), that show markets negatively react to terrorism events almost 
immediately, yet recover quickly, usually within the next trading day.  Furthermore, 
looking at the CAARs of this event, the BRICS show significant declines compared 
with the G7, which have steady returns over the period.   
 
6.2.3 Madrid Train Bombings 
 
The Madrid bombings which ripped through commuter trains during peak morning 
rush hour and killing 193, the highest death toll from a terror attack in Europe at that 
time, surprisingly saw little movements on many of the nations examined with only 
Germany and Brazil having negative reactions at a CAR significance level on event 
day at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. Moreover, on Day +1, these losses were 
immediately corrected at a significance of 10% for both nations. Moreover, the AARs 
show a smaller negative reaction on Day 0, as both the BRICS and G7 nations 
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recovered the next trading day, with the BRICS doing slightly better in which can be 
attributed to China and Russia’s positive returns throughout the period.  
 
Examining the CAARs we see an interesting contrast over the five days, with the 
BRICS nations having an overall cumulated average return positive, whereas the G7 
nations having an adverse reaction. These findings are in contrast with Arin, Cifferi 
and Spagnolo (2008) who found emerging markets experience more significant shocks 
to their markets for longer, whilst developed nations are more resilient in times of 
terrorist attacks of multiple terror attacks studies.  
 
6.2.4 London Bombings 
 
The attacks on London which targeted the morning rush hour transportations systems 
saw most of the EU nations within the G7 suffer negatively on Event Day, with 
Germany, Italy, UK, and France showing reaction at a 5% level of significance. The 
US and Canada on the other hand had little reaction, whilst Japan had slight reaction 
with no significance. Moreover, in relation to the AARs there appeared to be minimal 
reactions across the developed and emerging nations, with no statistical significance 
on evert day or the days ensuing. Furthermore, the CAARs during the London Terror 
attacks show that there were relatively minor negative reactions to the event with no 
statistical significance. This seems to be in line with the literature that over time, terror 
attacks have decreased in market significance since September11 as in line with studies 
by Kollias et al. (2011), Chen and Siems (2004), and Arin et al. (2008).  
 
6.2.5 Mumbai Taj Mahal Palace Attacks 
The attacks on hotels in Mumbai did little to the markets of the G7 in terms of ARs 
whereas they had various implications on the BRICS nations. Little effect was seen on 
the Event Day, however on Day +1, India, China, and Brazil all had negative reactions 
with significance at the 5% level. Moreover, this was followed by a correction with 
5% and 1% significance to India and China. Looking at the AARs and CAARs of the 
Mumbai terror attacks, there were relatively small negative reactions on Day +1, which 
quickly recovered on Day +2 with both the BRICS and G7 nations having insignificant 
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reactions to the event along with the five days ensuing the terror attack with no 
statistical significance.  
6.2.6 Boston Marathon Bombings 
 
Towards the end of the annual Boston Marathon event, two backpacks exploded in the 
crowd watching near the finish line, killing three people and injuring hundreds more.  
The event caused a significant drop on the G7 nations on Day +1 with the BRICS 
nations reacting positively to the news and this upward trend continued over the 
remaining five days of the event period.  Interesting however, looking at the CAARs, 
the reversal happens over the cumulative returns across the 11-day period. Whereas 
the overall effect on the G7 market is flat, in contrast to the BRICS having a noticeable 
decline which peaks one day before the event.  This highlights the importance of the 
CAARs given that the significant declines in AARs prior to the event occurring has 
resulted in noise/anomalies in the CAARs.   
 
6.2.7 Bataclan Paris Attacks 
 
The attack on the Bataclan Theatre and surrounding bars in Paris saw relatively minor 
reactions on global markets. On event day there were no significant movements in any 
of the nations examined in this study. As can be seen in the AARs, there was no 
significant reactions to the Event Day 0, with a slight decrease on Day +1. In relation 
to the CAARs, there is a positive trend across the 11-day period with a minor decrease 
observed on Day +1 followed by an increase on Day +2 which ended with another 
drop on Day +3. These finding show that the events in Paris seemed to have little effect 
on their overall markets, which might indicate that terror attacks have resulted in the 
market’s resilience over the decades since the September 11 attacks, with investors no 
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6.3 The Implications that Natural Disasters have on the BRICS and G7 
 
Over the past two decades there have been major natural disasters across the globe that 
have killed scores of people and caused record levels of infrastructure damage along 
with the costs associated with this. Prior literature has mainly focused on the sector 
implications, such as the insurance, tourism, and construction sectors rather than a 
market level approach. (Shelor et al. 1992, Yamori & Kobayashi 2002, Odell & 
Weidenmier 2004, Worthington & Valadkhani 2004, Yang et al. 2008, Li 2013, Tao 
2014) 
However, recently, given the extent of record-breaking disasters there have been 
studies examining the impact of natural disasters on within aggregate markets. (Lee et 
al. 2007, Ramiah 2013, Ferreria & Karali 2015, Koerniadi et al. 2016) 
This paper examines five natural disasters that have caused catastrophic damages in 
terms of cost, infrastructure damage, and unfortunately, loss of life. The five events 
are the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2002, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Sichuan 
Earthquake in 2008, Haiti Earthquake in 2010 and the Tōhoku Earthquake and 
Tsunami in 2011. 
We find similar findings regarding aggregate body of literature, with relatively minor 
statistical significance found across all the natural disasters examined with little impact 
on all 12 markets examined, except for Hurricane Katrina in the US, the costliest 
catastrophe at the time, along with the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami which 
wreaked havoc in Japan and their markets, consistent with Ferreria and Karali’s 2015 
study.  
Examining the AARs across all five disasters, in Figure 11, the natural disasters in 
percentage terms have little impact on the markets across the 11-day period examined. 
With emerging nations showing a positive overall reaction during a natural disaster, 
whilst developed nations had slightly worse returns over the period, entering negative 














Whereas the CAARs shown in Figure 12 demonstrate a relatively minor negative 
reaction of the 11-period for all the natural disasters, with Japan’s reaction to 
Fukushima attributing to much of this. Alternatively, the BRICS nations showed a 
positive reaction throughout the period, however, as explained early, this was 
attributed to Russia’s significant positive returns over four of the five natural disasters. 
There was no statistical significance over the 11-day period in either the BRICS, G7, 










Given the results of these events, the commentary will be limited compared with the 
previous categories and there being no statistical significance or reaction across the 
natural disasters examined in three of the five catastrophise examined. Except for 
Hurricane Katrina and the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami which had significant 
reactions during the period and thus these will be explained in more detail. The AAR 
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6.3.1 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami:  
 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami or commonly referred to as the Boxing Day Tsunami, 
occurred in the Asian region and affected numerous nations which included Indonesia 
and Thailand, resulting in the death of over 200,000 people with thousands more 
missing from all regions of the globe.  
 
The AARs show relatively marginal activity on the event day or days following the 
event, with the Russian rally on day -4, attributing to the 1.8% returns. There was no 
statistical significance across the 11-day period.  Whilst the CAARs show that there 
were no significant movements across the G7 nations, and a positive trend in the 
BRICS nations. The positive trend in the BRICS was influenced by Russia’s rally 
across the 11-day period, but as with the AARs, there was no statistical significance 
across the 11-day period.  These findings are consistent with Koerniadi, Krishnamurti 
and Tourani-Rad (2016) study which found that floods, tsunami, and volcanic 
eruptions having a limited impact on market returns. Along with Ramiah (2013) who 
analysed 12 countries on this disaster and did not find any significant impact on market 
returns of the equity portfolios examined. They also examined the effects five days 
after the event, to account for any market delays, and as we found, minimal changes 
in returns occurred.  
 
6.3.2 Hurricane Katrina 
 
Hurricane Katrina caused widespread damage across the South West coast of the US, 
wreaking havoc in the city of New Orleans in Louisiana, especially. This natural 
disaster caused record levels of damage at that time and would take the US years to 
recover from the effects of this Hurricane. The AARs show that overall, the developed 
nations of the G7 had a minor positive reaction on event day, with slight negative 
reactions one day ensuing the event and into day +2 with small levels of recovery in 
days +3 and +4. Moreover, the BRICS nations had a minor negative reaction to the 




Across the BRICS and G7 nations, there were no statistical significance across the 11-
day period examined. Whilst the CAARs demonstrate that the G7 had a general 
negative reaction to the event, which was mainly due to the US markets reaction which 
follows from past papers examining Hurricane Hugo and Katrina. Regarding the 
BRICS, there was a slight positive reaction but with no statistical significance across 
the event period examined.  
 
6.3.3 Sichuan Earthquake 
 
The earthquake that hit Sichuan in China in 2008 saw little reaction on world markets 
with small negative abnormal returns of approx. -0.50% in China, India, and South 
Africa.  
 
Examining the AARs and the CAARs show relatively small movements across the 11-
day period with the BRICS having slightly negative overall reaction on Day 0 and Day 
1 caused by China’s market reaction, with a recovery thereafter, and a large spike on 
day +2, which is attributed to a one-day gain in Russia of 3.15%.  
 
Alternatively, the G7 nations had relatively minor reactions throughout the entire 
sample, with AARs being relatively stable, apart from Day -3, which showed an 
increase of approximately 1%, which was attributed to increases in the UK, German, 
French, and Italian markets of over 1.5%, and the Japanese market at over 2%, with 
significance in Italy at the 5% level.  
 
Furthermore, the CAARs show a clearer picture of the activity of the 11-day period 
surrounding the Earthquake in China, with the G7 nations having minor activity with 
no statistical significance. The BRICS nations had an overall positive period, caused 
by the rallies in Russia, but did indeed see a small increase on the event day and 
corresponding trading day. As with the previous disasters, there were no statistical 





6.3.4 Haiti Earthquake 
 
The Earthquake in Haiti was selected as it was one of the deadliest disasters in history, 
killing an estimated 200,000 people. Moreover, this event which is not directly 
affecting any of the nations examined, which will give the samples selected a fair 
analysis on how markets react to an event not within their immediate region or their 
economic trading blocs.  
 
Examining the AARs and CAARs, the earthquake did little to the G7 nations whereas, 
there was an initiative negative reaction on Event Day in the BRICS nations but led to 
an overall trend that was positive over the five days ensuing the earthquake.  
 
An interest find is that the US had little reaction to the events of Haiti yet is the island’s 
largest trading partner in terms of imports USD$1.06B and exports USD$1.39B 
(International Trade Administration , 2020). On the other hand, China’s negative 
reaction on day +1, only accounts for 1.1% of Haiti’s exports, but 18.8% of their 
imports, which might explain why the Chinese market had an initial negative reaction. 
(Societe Generale 2020)  
 
6.3.5 Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami  
The Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami or known in the west, known as the Fukushima 
Earthquake, killed over 19,000 people, and led to the eventual nuclear meltdown of 
numerous nuclear power reactors in Fukushima. It is important to note that the nuclear 
power meltdown was significant in the aftermath of the earthquake and resulting 
tsunami this corresponding event, the author acknowledges, might cross-contaminate 
the event period examined which cannot be adjusted for. (World Nuclear Association 
2020) 
In relation to the AARs, there was an overall positive reaction within the BRICS to the 
events in Japan, with no significant reaction on Day +1, and positive returns over the 
ensuing five days. Alternatively, the G7 nations had an overall negative response over 
the event day and ensuing five days with a correction into positive territory on day +3 
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and onward. This downturn was mostly caused by Japan’s significant negative 
reactions to the event and days following. 
 
Japan suffered the greatest impact on the market with the TOPEX index dropping 
initially on Day 1 by -1.68% and subsequently crashing through days +1 and day +2 
by -6.97%, -7.68%. Interesting, on Day +3, the day the first explosion which occurred 
at 11.01AM the nuclear facility, the markets ended the day with an increase of +7.18%.  
Moreover, on day +4 the market would fall by -2.11% and then increase on Day 5 at -
1.71%. (Wolchover 2011) 
 
The US, Canada, and the UK had relatively low reactions throughout the period, 
although there was significance in those returns, at the 1% level, US, and Canada, and 
10% level, UK. Interestingly, the US, Canada, and the UK had positive reactions on 
day +2, whilst Germany, France, and Italy had negative reactions. On Day +3, those 
positive reactions were negative, with the US, UK, Germany, France, and Italy, within 
the 1-2% region at a significance of 1%, the US and France, 5%, Germany, and 10%, 
UK and Italy. Day+4 had corrections to those loses on all nations mentioned, with 
Germany and France at the 10% level of significance.  
 
Surprisingly, the only other statistical significance was in China, which had cumulative 
returns in the positive region throughout the event period. However, the positive 
cumulation can be attributed to the high ARs on days -5, and -4, at +1.45% and +2.51% 
respectively, with minimal movement until day +3 which was another strong market 
performance of +1.94 but did then see a drop in AR on day +4 of -2.42. This result 
demonstrates that the natural disaster of a developed nation and neighbour of China, 
had little impact on their markets and was one of the most interesting findings in this 
study. This may signify that China’s economic strength and independence in the region 
played significance in how their national market reacted, with the nation being the 
second most powerful economy in the world, with the US the most powerful, and Japan 
being the third.   
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Moreover, the reaction of the market in Japan are in line with Ferreria and Karali 
(2015) study that found Japan’s markets reacted significantly to a domestic natural 
disaster event.  
All the findings are in line with prior findings with a report by the Nasdaq which 
observed the stock market reaction to the Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, Haiti 
Earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the Tōhoku Earthquake. It appeared that after 
every disaster, the stock market would have a small decline in a very short period and 
then the whole market would go up, except for the Japanese market. (Nasdaq 2011) 
Moreover, as with prior research, there tends to be less volatility in terms of natural 
disasters effects over a shorter period given the long-term effects they have on an 
economy. Significant losses are seen to be dependent on other factors such as whether 
a nation’s economy is dependent on tourism, or certain industries being negatively 
affected whilst other sectors hedge this loss. (Worthington & Valadkhani 2004, Li 
2013) 
Furthermore, we find the US has had little, if any impact on any of the disasters 
examined thus far, along with other G7 nations, apart from Japan in relation to 
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We employed an event study methodology to investigate the impact of seven financial 
disasters, seven terror attacks, and five natural disasters across 12 nations within the 
developed (BRICS) and emerging nations (G7).   
 
To measure the effect of these events on their respective stock markets, this paper 
employs a market adjusted model using a ten-day event window, with five days 
preluding and five days ensuing an events occurrence. The national indices of each 
nation are benchmarked against MSCI ACWI, which covers 86% of the global equities 
markets. 
 
We find in relation to financial crises that the nations domestically affected by each 
financial crisis demonstrate the most significance in terms of negative returns along 
with statistical significance, except for the United States during the Global Financial 
Crisis. Moreover, it has been shown over time, the contagion effect of each 
corresponding crisis has increased, with more nations outside the domestic region of 
those affected showing signs of statistically significant reactions to the various 
economic pitfalls and crisis’ over the last three decades examined. These findings are 
parallel with studies by Brown and Warner (1985), Schoder and Vankudre (1986), 
Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), and Bekiros (2014). 
 
Furthermore, emerging economies of the BRICS experience the most impact in terms 
of significance on the movements within their respective national stock markets, along 
with a sustained duration in comparison to the developed nations.  
 
In relation to the seven terror attacks examined, we find that there is a clear indication 
that all markets react negatively to a terror attack, with the BRICS nations having a 
considerably worse reaction than those of the G7.  However, over the sampled seven 





Lastly, in the examination of five natural disasters, there is only a relatively minor 
negative reaction over the 11-day period for all the natural disasters with no statistical 
significance, apart from Japan’s reaction to the Tōhoku Earthquake and Tsunami 
which was significant at the 1% level.  
 
These findings are important in a corporate context, as well as for decision makers, 
policy makers, and market participants in gauging how catastrophic events affect the 
stock markets and therefore the ability to make informed decisions regarding 
investment diversification in alternative markets or how to reduce the contagion effect. 
It has also reinforced the volatility of the emerging markets and how their markets are 
still affected by events occurring in developed nations. 
 
7.1 Future Direction of Research  
 
After conducting this research and analysing the results with prior literature, we feel 
that expanding this topic is warranted with up-to-date analysis on events that have 
occurred recently which will further add to the commentary within this field. As 
pointed out in prior literature, there are some aspects of each catastrophic event that 
primarily focuses on such as industry reactions rather than indices, and heavy reliance 
of the US and UK’s market and their effects on emerging nations.  We suggest the 
continued study into the BRICS and other emerging nations reactions to a variety of 
events and developed nations as these economies continue to influence the global 
economic region and the future implications of understanding how they react in times 
of crisis is important for corporate decision makers, policy makers, and market 
participants.  
 
Moreover, with the rise in costs and associated damage of natural disasters, we believe 
further research on this topic is more relevant than ever as climate change impacts all 
facets of life, be it social, economic, or political. With companies implementing and 
promoting more sustainable practices considering the increase in investors demand for 
more environmentally sustainable operations, this may in fact signal a change or 
evolution in how the markets reacts to a natural disaster occurring in the future. As the 
globe becomes more aware of the economic and environmental impact caused by 
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climate change with resulting increases in natural catastrophise, market participants as 
such might react differently to such events occurring which will alter what we have 
historically seen. 
 
Lastly, with the world as connected and integrated as ever, the contagion effect that 
negative announcements has still signifies the need for research in the effects negative 
impacts in other nations has upon its neighbours and economic partners and whether 
the contagion effect has increased or decreased as integration between nations 




After conducting the analysis and concluding commentary there are certain aspects 
within this study that might limit the results based on variables and other external 
factors. 
 
Firstly, cross contamination of results occurs when multiple events occur within the 
same period an event occurs and might affect the results in either overestimating or 
underestimating the events of the examined event. This then might lead to the false 
rejection of a hypothesis as a result, in the worst case.  
 
After conducting the analysis, we found two instances that might have contaminated 
the data which we will highlight now. The first case occurred within 2008 when the 
terror attacks of Mumbai coinciding with the ongoing global financial crisis. At that 
time, the financial crisis was wreaking havoc across most of the US and Europe and 
as such we might attribute some of the findings within the G7 to the financial crisis, 
rather than the terror attack in India.  
 
Furthermore, as prior research has also identified, Ferreira and Karali (2015), the 
earthquake and tsunami in Japan had a significant aftermath event in the short days 
following the disaster in the form of a nuclear meltdown event that destroyed multiple 
reactors. Therefore, we cannot attribute the findings across the event period to the 
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natural disaster alone but must consider the possibility that the meltdown had some 
effect on the markets in Japan and across the globe.  
 
In addition, we assume that investors are all risk neutral and rational and markets are 
all efficient. However as behavioural finance tells us, this might not necessarily rain 
true as investors might in fact act in irrational ways to the events occurring and 
therefore reactions and examinations of patterns may be difficult to ascertain.  
 
Lastly, one of the limitations is the event study itself and the flexible and simplistic 
nature that allows the researchers to conduct an event study at their discretion. In other 
words, the event study allows multiple event periods, estimation periods to be used 
with no current consensus on a standard event period or estimation period, which may 
lead to bias. Furthermore, the various models a researcher can use will all provide 
different results along with the tests used to examine the significance.   
 
7.3 Improvements  
 
After conducting this study, we acknowledge that improvements can be made to 
further enhance the power of the analysis conducted.  
 
Firstly, increasing the sample size of both events examined and nations would ensure 
a more effective and critical study along with implications of these negative events on 
a broader and larger sample. 
 
Moreover, we would consider using multiple timeframes to gauge how markets have 
reacted over a time and determine whether there is any distinction between how a 
market has adjusted to these catastrophes over time, such as per decade comparisons.  
 
Furthermore, we might implement more statistical tests such nonparametric 
significance tests like the Sign test, Rank test, Patell test, and Wilcoxon tests. They 
would provide an additional insight into the significance of the events examined, 
which we did not feel the need to implement in this study given the scope of this study 




Lastly, we might use a variety of returns models along with a variation of event 





Aggarwal, R., Inclan, C. & Leal, R., 1999. Volatility in Emerging Stock Markets. 
Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis. 
Akhtar, S., Faff, R., Oliver, B. & Subrahmanyam, A., 2011. The power of bad: the 
negatively bias Australian consumer sentiment announcements on stock return. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, pp. 1239-1249. 
Aloui, R., Nguyen, D. K. & Ben Aissa, M. S., 2011. Global financial crisis, extreme 
interdependencies, and contagion effects: The role of economic structure?. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 35(1), pp. 130-141. 
Angbazo, L. A. & Narayanan, R., 1996. Catastrophic shocks in the property-liability 
insurance industry: evidence on regulatory and contagion effects. Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 63(4). 
Antweiller, W. & Frank, M., 2006. Do US Stock Markets Typically Overreact to 
Corporate News Stories?. s.l.:University of British Columbia. 
Arin, K., Cifferi, D. & Spagnolo, N., 2008. The price of terror: The effects of terrorism 
on stock market returns and volatility. Economic Letters, pp. 164-167. 
Bae, K.-H. & Karolyi, A. G., 1994. Good news, bad news and international spillovers 
of stock return volatility between Japan and the U.S. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
2(4), pp. 405-438. 
Baig, T. & Goldfajn, I., 1999. Financial market contagion in the Asian crisis. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Issue 46, pp. 167-195. 
Baker, M. & Stein, J. C., 2004. Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 7(3), pp. 271-299. 
104 
 
BAKER, M. & WURGLER, J., 2006. Investor Sentiment and the Cross-Section of 
Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 8, 61(4), pp. 1645-1680. 
Baker, M. & Wurgler, J., 2007. Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 4, 21(2), pp. 129-151. 
Baker, M. & Yuan, Y., 2012. Global, local, and contagious investor sentiment. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 1 5, 104(2), pp. 272-287. 
Ball, R. & Brown, P., 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 6(2), pp. 159-178. 
Banz, R., 1981. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 3-18. 
Bartram, S. M. & Bodnar, G. M., 2009. No Place to Hide: The Global Crisis in Equity 
Markets in 2008/09. Journal of International Money and Finance, 8(28), pp. 1246-
1292. 
Beirne, J., Caporale, G. M., Schulze-Ghattas, M. & Spagnolo, N., 2009. Volatility 
Spillovers and Contagion from Mature to Emerging Stock Markets. ECB Working 
Paper No. 1113. 
Bekiros, S., 2014. Contagion, decoupling and the spillover effects of the US financial 
crisis: Evidence from the BRICS markets. International Review of Financial Analysis, 
Issue 33, pp. 58-69. 
Bentley, J., 2013. Do Eurozone Sovereign Credit Downgrade Events Effect the 
Banking Sector: An Australian Study, Townsville: s.n. 
Bhagat, S., 2002. Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate 
Law. American Law and Economics Association, 4(2), pp. 380-423. 
105 
 
Binder, J., 1998. The Event Study Methodology Since 1969. Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, pp. 111-137. 
Bonga.Bonga, L., 2018. Uncovering equity market contagion among BRICS 
countries: An application of the multivariate GARCH model. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, Volume 67, pp. 36-44. 
Brounen, D. & Derwell, J., 2010. The impact of terrorism attacks on international stock 
markets. European Financial Management, pp. 585-595. 
Brown, G. W. & Cliff, M. T., 2004. Investor sentiment and the near-term stock market. 
Journal of Empirical Finance, 11(1), pp. 1-27. 
BROWN, J. R., IVKOVIĆ, Z., SMITH, P. A. & WEISBENNER, S., 2008. Neighbors 
Matter: Causal Community Effects and Stock Market Participation. The Journal of 
Finance, 6, 63(3), pp. 1509-1531. 
Brown, S. & Warner, J., 1980. Measuring Security Price Performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics, pp. 205-258. 
Brown, S. & Warner, J., 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 3-31. 
Buttner, D. & Hayo, B., 2011. Determinants of European stock market integration. 
Economic Systems, Issue 35, pp. 574-585. 
Campbell, J. Y., Lo, A. W. & MacKinlay, A. C., 1997. The Econometrics of Financial 
Markets. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 




Carter, D. & Simkins, B., 1996. The market´s reaction to unexpected, catastrophic 
events: The case of airline stock returns and the September 11th attacks. The Quarterly 
Review of Economic and Finance, pp. 539-558. 
Cavallo, E., Powell, A. & Becerra, O., 2010. Estimating the direct economic damages 
of the Earthquake in Haiti. The Economic Journal, Issue 120, pp. F298-F312. 
Chen, A. & Siems, T., 2004. The effects of terrorism on global capital markets. 
European Journal of Political Economy, pp. 349-366. 
Chesney, M., Reshetar, G. & Kuraman, M., 2011. The impact of terrorism on the 
capital markets; An empirical study. Journal of Banking and Finance, pp. 253-267. 
Chittedi, K. R., 2009. International Capital Market Integration: Some Conceptual and 
Empirical Issues. PCTE Journal of Business Management, 6(1). 
Claessens, S., Park, Y. C. & Dornbusch, R., 2000. Contagion: Understanding how it 
spreads. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Developed - The World Bank. 
Cornell, B. & Shapiro, A., 1986. The reaction of bank stock prices to the international 
debt crisis. The Journal of Banking and Finance, pp. 59-73. 
Corrado, C., 2011. Event Studies: A methodology review. Accounting & Finance, pp. 
207-234. 
Cutler, D. et al., 1989. What moves stock prices?. The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Issue 5, pp. 4-12. 
Da, Z., Engelberg, J. & Gao, P., 2011. In Search of Attention. The Journal of Finance, 
LXVI(5), pp. 1461-1499. 
Da, Z., Engelberg, J. & Gao, P., 2014. The Sum of All FEARS Investor Sentiment and 
Asset Prices. The Review of Financial Studies, pp. 1-33. 
107 
 
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H. & Waldmann, R. J., 1990. Noise Trader 
Risk in Financial Markets. Journal of Political Economy, 8, 98(4), pp. 703-738. 
Dimsen, E., 1979. Risk Management When Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading. 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 197-226. 
Dolley, J. C., 1933. Characteristics and Procedure of Common Stock Split-Ups. 
Harvard Business Review, Volume 11, pp. 316-326. 
Dooley, M. & Hutchinson, M. M., 2009. Transmission of the U.S. Subprime Crisis to 
Emerging Markets: Evidence on the Decoupling-Recoupling Hypothesis. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, 8(28), pp. 1331-1349. 
Dyckman, T., Philbrick, D. & Stephen, J., 1984. A Comparison of Event Study 
Methodologies Using Daily Stock Returns: A Simulation Approach. Journal of 
Accounting Research. 
Fama, E., 1965. The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices. Journal of Business, pp. 34-
105. 
Fama, E., 1991. Efficient Capital Markets: II. The Journal of Finance, pp. 1575-1617. 
Fama, E. F., 1970. Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work. The Journal of Finance, 5, 25(2), p. 383. 
Fama, E., Fischer, L., Jensen, M. & Roll, R., 1969. The adjustment of stock prices to 
new information. International Economic Review, 10(1), pp. 1-21. 
Fama, E. & French, K., 2002. The Equity Risk Premium. Journal of Finance, 62(2), 
pp. 637-359. 
Ferreira, S. & Karali, B., 2015. Do Earthquakes Shake Stock Markets?. PLoS ONE. 
108 
 
Forbes, K., 2002. Are trade linkages important determinants of country vulnerability 
to crises?. In: S. Edwards & J. Frankel, eds. Preventing currency crises in emerging 
markets. Chicago: University of Chicago, pp. 77-132. 
Forbes, K. & Rigobon, R., 2002. No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring 
Stock Market Co-Movements. The Journal of Finance, Issue 57, pp. 2223-2261. 
Grima, S. & Caruan, L., 2017. The effect of the financial crisis on emerging markets: 
A comparative analysis of the stock market situation before and after. European 
Research Studies Journal XX, Volume 4B, pp. 727-753. 
Hamao, Y., Masulis, R. W. & Ng, V., 1990. Correlations in Price Changes and 
Volatility across International Stock Markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 3(2), 
pp. 281-307. 
Hwang, B.-H., 2011. Country-specific sentiment and security prices. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 100(2), pp. 382-401. 
Hwang, E., Min, H.-G., Kim, B.-H. & Kim, H., 2013. Determinants of stock market 
comovements among US and emerging economies during the US financial crisis. 
Economic Modelling, Issue 35, pp. 338-348. 
International Monetary Fund, 2010. How Did Emerging Markets Cope in the Crisis?, 
New York: International Monetary Fund. 









Kajitani, Y., Chang, S. & Tatano, H., 2013. Economic impacts of the 2011 Tohoku-
Oki earthquake and tsunami. Earthquake Spectra, Issue 29, pp. S457-S478. 
Kaminsky, G. & Schmukler, S., 1999. What triggers market jitters? A chronicle of the 
Asian crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, pp. 537-560. 
King, M. & Wadhwani, S., 1990. Transmission of volatility between stock markets. 
Review of Financial Studies, Issue 3, pp. 5-33. 
Koerniadi, H., Krishnamurti, C. & Tourani-Rad, A., 2016. Natural Disasters - Blessing 
in Disguise?. The Singapore Economic Review, 61(1). 
Kollias, C., Papadamou, S. & Stagiannis, A., 2011. Terrorism and capital markets: The 
effects of the Madrid and London bomb attacks. International Review of Economics 
and Finance, pp. 535-541. 
Kostopoulos, D. & Meyer, S., 2018. Disentangling investor sentiment: Mood and 
household attitudes towards the economy. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Volume 155, pp. 28-78. 
Kothari, S. & Warner, J. B., 2007. The Econometrics of Event Studies. First ed. 
Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Lamb, R. P. & Kennedy, W. F., 1997. Insurer Stock Prices and Market Efficiency 
Around the Los Angeles Earthquake. Journal of Insurance Issues. 
Lee, H., Wu, H. & Wang, Y., 2007. Contagion effect in financial markets after the 
South-East Asia Tsunami. Research in International Business and Finance, Issue 21, 
pp. 281-296. 
Lee, S. B. & Kim, K. J., 1993. Does the October 1987 crash strengthen the co-




Li, S., 2012. The Australian capital market reaction to natural catastrophes: an 
empirical analysis using event study method. World Business Institute Australia, pp. 
1-19. 
MacKinley, A., 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic 
Literature, pp. 13-39. 
Mahalingam, A. et al., 2018. Impacts of Severe Natural Catastrophes on Financial 
Markets, Cambridge: Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies. 
Malkiel, B. G., 2003. The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17(1), pp. 59-82. 
Mandelbrot, B., 1966. Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and 'Martingle' 
Models. Journal of Business, Volume 39, pp. 242-255. 
Marshall, B. R., Nguyen, N. H. & Visaltanachoti, N., 2017. A Note in Intraday Event 
Studies. s.l.:s.n. 
Moser, T., 2003. What is International Financial Contagion?. International Finance, 
6(2), pp. 157-178. 
Nasdaq, 2011. 5 Worst Disasters - How Did the Stock Market Reaction?. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/5-worst-disasters-how-did-stock-
market-react-2011-03-25 
[Accessed 25 09 2020]. 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2020. 
The Global Terrorism Database. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
111 
 
Nikkinen, J., Saleem, K. & Martikainen, M., 2013. Transmission of the Supreme 
Crisis: Evidence from Industrial and Financial Sectors of BRIC Countries. Journal of 
Applied Business Research. 
Nikkinen, J. & Vahamaa, S., 2010. Terrorism and Stock market sentiment. Financial 
Review, pp. 263-275. 
Odell, K. & Weidenmier, M., 2004. Real shock, monetary aftershock: the 1906 San 
Francisco earthquake and the panic of 1907. The Journal of Economic History, Issue 
64, pp. 1002-1027. 
O'Neill, 2001. Building Better Global Economic BRICs, New York: Goldman Sachs. 
Park, D., Ramayandi, A. & Shin, K., 2013. Why Did Asian Countries Fare Better 
during the Global Financial Crisis than during the Asian Financial Crisis. In: 
Responding to Financial Crisis: Lessons from Asia then, the United States and Europe 
Now. s.l.:A copublication of the Asian Development Bank and Peterson Institute for 
International Economies, pp. 103-138. 
Peng, G., Huiming, Z. & Wanhai, Y., 2018. Asymmetric dependence between 
economic policy uncertainty and stock market returns in G7 and BRIC: A quantile 
regression approach. Finance Research Letters, pp. 251-258. 
Pereria, D., 2018. Financial Contagion in the BRICS Stock Market: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Lehman Brothers Collapse and European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
Journal of Economic and Financial Analysis, 2(1), pp. 1-44. 
Peterson, P., 1989. Event Studies: A Review of Issues and Methodology. Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, pp. 39-66. 
Radelet, S. & Sachs, J., 2000. The onset of the Asian financial crisis.  
112 
 
Ramiah, V., 2013. Effects of the Boxing Day Tsunami on the world capital markets. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 40(2), pp. 383-401. 
Ramiah, V. et al., 2010. Changes in equity returns and volatility across different 
Australian industries following the recent terrorist attacks. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal, 18(1), pp. 64-76. 
Ranjeeni, K. & Sharma, S. S., 2015. The Effect of the Lehman Brothers' Bankruptcy 
on the Performance of Chinese Sectors. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 5(51), 
pp. 904-914. 
Saens, R. & Sandoval, E., 2005. Measuring Security Price Performance Using Chilean 
Daily Stock Returns: The Event Study Method. Cuaderns de Economia, Volume 42, 
pp. 307-328. 
Samarakoon, L., 2011. Stock Market Interdependence, contagion, and the U.S. 
financial crisis: The case of emerging and frontier markets. International Financial 
Markets and Money, Volume 21, pp. 724-742. 
Samuelson, W. F., 1965. Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly. 
Industrial Management Review, Volume Spring, pp. 54-49. 
Schoder, S. & Vankudre, W., 1986. The market for bank stocks and banks ‘disclosure 
of cross-border exposure: The 1982 Mexican debt crisis. Studies in Banking and 
Finance, pp. 179-202. 
Scholes, M. & Williams, J., 1977. Estimating Betas from Nonsynchronous Data. 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 309-327. 
Scholtens, B. & Voorhorst, Y., 2013. The impact of earthquakes on the domestic stock 
market. Earthquake Spectra, Issue 29, pp. 325-337. 
113 
 
Schwart, G., 2003. Anomalies and market efficiency. Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, pp. 939-974. 
Seiler, M., 2004. Performing Financial Studies: A Methodological Cookbook. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Shan, L. & Gong, S. X., 2012. Investor sentiment and stock returns: Wenchuan 
Earthquake. Finance Research Letters, 1(9), pp. 36-47. 
Sharpe, W., 1964. Capital Asset Prices: a theory of equilibrium under conditions of 
risk. Journal of Finance, pp. 425-442. 
Shelor, R., Anderson, D. & ML, C., 1992. Gaining from loss: property-liability insurer 
stock values in the aftermath of the 1989 California earthquake. Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, Issue 59, pp. 476-488. 
Sias, R. W., 1996. Volatility and the Institutional Investor. Financial Analysts Journal, 
3, 52(2), pp. 13-20. 
Singala, S. & Kumar, N., 2012. The global financial crisis with a focus on the European 
sovereign debt crisis. ASCI Journal of Management, pp. 20-36. 
Smirlock, M. & Kaufold, H., 1987. Bank foreign lending, mandatory disclosure rules, 
and the reaction of bank stock prices to the Mexican debt crisis. Journal of Business, 
pp. 347-364. 
Société Générale, 2020. Haiti: Country Risk. [Online]  
Available at: https://import-export.societegenerale.fr/en/country/haiti/trade-country-
risk 
[Accessed 11 08 2020]. 





[Accessed 15 08 2020]. 
Tao, Z., 2014. Short-term economic effect of the M7.0 Lushan earthquake. Natural 
Hazards, Issue 70, pp. 1247-1261. 
van der Molen, M., 2013. The Tequila crisis 1994, s.l.: Rabobank. 






[Accessed 12 08 2020]. 
World Nuclear Association, 2020. Fukushima Daiichi Accident. [Online]  
Available at: https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-
security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident.aspx 
[Accessed 12 08 2020]. 
Worthington, A. & Valadkhani, A., 2004. Measuring the impact of natural disasters 
on capital markets; an empirical application using intervention analysis. Applied 
Economics, Issue 2004, pp. 2177-2186. 
Worthington, A. & Valadkhani, A., 2006. Catastrophic shocks and capital markets: a 
comparative analysis by disaster and sector. Global Economic Review, Issue 3, pp. 
331-344. 
Yamori, N. & Kobayashi, T., 2002. Do Japanese Insurers benefit from a catastrophic 
event? Market reactions to the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake. Journal of Japanese 
and International Economies, Issue 16, pp. 92-108. 
115 
 
Yang, C., Wang, M. & Chen, X., 2008. Catastrophe effects on stock markets and 
catastrophe risk securitization. The Journal of Risk Finance, Issue 9, pp. 232-243. 
Yolsal, H., 2011. Applications of Parametric and Nonparametric Tests for Event 
Studies on ISE. Ekonometri ve Istatistik Sayn, pp. 53-72. 
Yu, J. & Yuan, Y., 2011. Investor sentiment and the mean–variance relation. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 100(2), pp. 367-381. 
Zouhair, M., Lanouar, C. & Ajmi, A. N., 2014. Contagion versus Interdependence: 
The Case of the BRIC Countries During the Subprime Crises. Emerging Markets and 





APPENDIX A –CAR CHARTS 












-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Dotcom Crash
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA













-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Russian Financial Crisis
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA













-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Asian Financial Crisis
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA








-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Tequila Crisis
USA CAN UK GER FRA











-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Chinese Black Monday Crash
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA











-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Global Financial Crisis
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA







-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
All Financial Crises
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA










-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
London Bombings
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA










-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Madrid Bombings
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Bali Bombings
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
September 11 Terror Attacks
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA














-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Bataclan Paris Attacks
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA










-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Boston Marathon Bombings
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA








-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Mumbai Terror Attacks
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA











-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
All Terror Attacks
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA











-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Haiti Earthquake
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA







-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Sichuan Earthquake
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA












-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Hurricane Katrina
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA













-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA










-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Tohko Earthquake and Tsunami
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA









-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
All Natural Disaster Events
USA CAN UK GER FRA ITA
JAP BRA RUS IND CHI RSA
122 
 
APPENDIX B – AAR & CAAR RETURNS TABLES 
Financial Crisis AAR & CAAR Returns Tables 
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